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ABSTRACT
Agriculture is heavily subsidised and protected in most of the major industrial
countries. Some of the effects are obvious through the heavy costs imposed on
national budgets. Other effects, such as those on consumers or on overall economic
efficiency, are less obvious but are nonetheless extremely important. In South Africa
there has never been an attempt to calculate total government intervention in
agriculture. However, this changed at the time of the negotiations for the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the GATT, and the
greater importance of the consumer in the designing of agricultural policies.
The aim of this study is to determine whether the production of wheat in the Western
Cape is economically optimal under the current policy environment. The study
investigates if there was a comparative advantage in the production of wheat as of
April 1999. The technique used to calculate the various indicators of comparative
advantage is the Policy Analysis Matrix. This technique is used to identify the effects
of policy measures on the social profitability of wheat production.
The analysis used data from eight areas, and seventeen varying enterprise budgets
were constructed in order to compile a representative picture of the industry's
condition. The results of the analysis indicate that Western Cape wheat producers do
not have a strong comparative advantage in the production of wheat for the selected
areas. The reasoning behind this is complex, but is primarily a result of high levels of
input use. Input prices are inflated by policy distortions in input markets, partly
because of tariffs on imported inputs. The net effect of the total policy environment
also had a negative effect on producers, in the sense that sub-normal profits were
achieved.
The future of the Western Cape and South African wheat farmer is uncertain. What is
certain is that, if the wheat farmer in South Africa does not take immediate and swift
action, directed at improving efficiency in current management and production
techniques, and implementing some form of crop diversification, farm debt will
ultimately be the demise of the farmer. As interest rates rapidly increase, and
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producer prices remain constant or decrease, the farmer begins to farm more for the
bank than for private remuneration.
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UITTREKSEL
In die meeste groot industriele lande word landbou grootliks gesubsidieer en beskerm.
Sommige van die effekte word weerspieël in hoë kostes in die nasionale begroting.
Ander effekte soos die op verbruikers is minder vanselfsprekend, maar steeds baie
belangrik. Voorheen is daar geen poging aangewend om die totale
owerheidsinmenging in landbou in Suid-Afrika te bereken nie. Dit het egter verander
met die onderhandelinge rondom die Uruguay Ronde van die AOTH, en die groter
belangrikheid van die verbruiker in die ontwerp van landboubeleid.
Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal of dit ekonomies optimaal is om koring in
die Wes-Kaap te produseer onder die huidige beleidsomgewing. Met ander woorde,
die studie poog om te bepaal wat die vergelykende voordeel, indien enige, is by
koringproduksie. Die tegniek wat gebruik is om die verskillende indikatore van
vergelykende voordeel te bereken, is die Beleidsanalise Matriks of PAM. Die tegniek
word gebruik om die effek van die beleid met betrekking tot koringproduksie te
identifiseer.
Agt produksiestreke in die Wes-Kaap is ontleed vir die doeleindes van hierdie analise.
Sewentien verskillende bedryfsvertakkingsbegrotings is hiervan afgelei om sodoende
'n goeie verteenwoordigende beeld van die bedryfstoestande te kry. Die resultate van
die analise toon aan dat koringproduksie in die Weskaap nie 'n sterk vergelykende
voordeel het nie. Die rede hiervoor is kompleks, maar die hoë vlak van inset gebruik
kan beskou word as hoofrede. Hoër insetpryse, na aanleiding van die
beleidsversteuringe in insetmarkte, is deels die gevolg van invoerbeskerming in die
vorm van tariewe op ingevoerde insette. Die netto effek van die totale
beleidsomgewing het ook 'n negatiewe effek op die produsente gehad, veral in die sin
dat subnormale winste behaal is.
Die toekoms van koringboere in die Wes-Kaap en Suid-Afrika is onseker. Wat wel
seker is, is dat as koringboere in Suid-Afrika nie daadwerklike en vinnige hul
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bestuurs- en produksieeffektiwiteit verbeter me, sal skuld toeneem en sal dit
koeringboerdery se einde beteken. Soos rentekoerse vinniger toeneem en die
produsenteprys konstant bly of afneem, sal boere meer aan skuld afbetaal as wat hulle
uit koringboerdery kan verdien.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
South Africa's agriculture is in the midst of long-term fundamental change.
Beginning in the 1980's, major policy reforms were launched leading toward sharply
reduced levels of protection for the farming sector (Vink, 1993). These changes,
when taken together, comprise a fundamentally new environment for agriculture, an
environment offering both challenges and opportunities for agricultural policy
analysts.
Recent research on the economics of wheat production in the Western Cape includes
Street et al. (1998), who have compared yields and production costs of wheat in South
Africa with that of other major wheat producing countries; Troskie (1998), who has
analysed South Africa's position in the international market, as well as the effect of an
ad valarum tariff on export parity; and Troskie & Wallace (1996), who have analysed
the influence of a weakening exchange rate. None of these studies has, however,
analysed the comparative advantage of domestic wheat production, which is a sounder
basis for assessing the international competitiveness of an industry, until Ohene-
Anyang's recent (1997) study.
However, Ohene-Anyang's study focussed on wheat production in the summer
rainfall regions of South Africa. The study was therefore limited to the following
areas, with budgetary data from the 1994/95 season:
Douglas - Northern Cape
Bethlehem - Eastern Free State
Bergville - KwaZulu / Natal
Brits - North West and
Ventersdorp - North West
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2As is evident, the study omitted the Western Cape wheat producing regions. The
Western Cape has over the years produced a substantial proportion of the country's
wheat, and is currently the largest producer of the nine provinces (SAGIS, 1998
estimates). The Western Cape is indeed an important player in the South .African
wheat industry. Furthermore, wheat production is an important contributor to the
Western Cape economy, and the production of wheat has been experiencing
deteriorating trends in the recent past. Thus, a study of the comparative advantage of
Western Cape wheat production is justified.
1.2 The Problem
The central question that needs to be addressed, and the one that defines the purpose
of this study, is whether or not Western Cape wheat farmers have a comparative
advantage in the world wheat market. Closely inter-linked with this question is the
issue of policy support and distortion, which dominates the core reasoning behind
many countries' comparative advantage in specified industries.
South African agriculture presently produces a low share of GDP, largely as a
consequence of structural changes occurring in the economy. Widespread policy
distortions, introduced by decades of government intervention, has contributed to this
phenomenon (Food Review, February 1998). These interventions were guided by the
general political and economic philosophy of white domination - apartheid. Some of
these distortions are not peculiar to agriculture, but characterise the entire economy,
for example, the high capital-intensity of production in the presence of widespread
unemployment.
Nonetheless, it is true that agriculture has been and remams subject to policy
distortions that have been especially far reaching. As a consequence of the incentive
structure created by policy distortions, agriculture's structure, characteristics, and,
most notably, its performance, are in a condition of flux, and one can expect that the
future holds much uncertainty (The World Bank, 1994). Hence, this gives ample
justification for an analysis of the comparative advantage of the wheat industry in the
Western Cape, using the Policy Analysis Matrix.
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1.3 The Study Area
The Western Cape Province is divided into five administrative areas:
The North West, Swartland, Boland, the Little Karoo, and the South Coast.
NORTH WEST
LITTLE KAROO
Figure 1.1: Administrative areas of the Western Cape
3
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Of these five administrative areas, wheat is only grown in three. These three include
the Little Karoo, the Swartland, and the South Coast. The sub-areas of these three
administrative areas, in which wheat is grown, are presented in Figure 1.2 below.
Figure 1.2: Wheat Producing Areas of the Western Cape
(SENSAKO, Winter '99)
These sub-areas are divided as follows:
1. Western section of the Swartland (Sandveld, Rooi-Karoo, West Coast and Darling
regions)
2. Middle Swartland
3. Ruens (Caledon, Bredasdorp, Napier and Swellendam)
4. Southern Cape (Heildelberg, Riversdal, Albertinia and Mosselbay)
5. Langkloof
6. Small Karoo region
7. Humansdorp, Hankey, Patensie
4
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B) South Coast
In order to approach this study simply and yet retain validity and credibility,
representative study areas were chosen. The major wheat producing areas of the
Western Cape are situated in the Swartland and South Coast sub-regions, which
comprise roughly ninety-five percent of the total wheat producing areas of the
Western Cape, around sixty percent being in the Swartland region.
Therefore, the Little Karoo, along with the North West and the Boland were omitted
from the study, and only the major wheat producing areas in the Swartland and South
Coast were considered. These two sub-areas were further divided into thirteen
farming regions, which are listed below:
A) Swartland
1. Middle Swartland: (Moorreesburg region)
2. Piketberg-Porterville mountains
3. Sandveld
4. Koringberg-Red Karoo
5. High rainfall Koeberg-Malmesbury area
6. Durbanville-Paardeberg mixed farming area
7. Constantia-Philippi
8. Villiersdorp-Vyeboom
9. Botrivier
10. Ruens
11. Bredasdorp-Strandveld
12. Strandveld foothills
13. Dune veld
The study is therefore based on these thirteen farming regions. The most important
areas, with regards to production quantity (total yield and yield per hectare), were
taken into consideration and the rest omitted. Selection of the study area is dealt with
in Chapter 6.
5
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1.5 Outline of the Study
1.4 Objective of the Study
The main purpose of this thesis is as follows:
1. To determine the comparative advantage of the Western Cape commercial wheat
farming, using an accounting technique called the Policy Analysis Matrix (Monke
& Pearson, 1989), that classifies data on revenues and production, and marketing
costs and revenues for specific rural activities, technologies, and market channels.
2. To reveal the various distorting effects, if any, of the current policy environment,
on the production of wheat in the Western Cape.
In Chapter Two, a background on wheat production around the globe is provided, and
this is followed in Chapter Three by a background on policy that could affect the
wheat industry, with particular reference to the South African context. Chapter Four
establishes the reasoning behind the choice of the Policy Analysis Matrix for this
study. Chapter Five continues the theoretical basis of the study, with a look at shadow
pricing. Chapter Six gives the results from the application of the methodology. In
Chapter Seven, the conclusions derived from the results are set out, and this chapter
serves as the culmination of the study.
6
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CHAPTER TWO
THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR WHEAT
2.1 Introduction
In South Africa, wheat is grown mainly for human consumption. However, small
amounts of wheat, not fit for milling purposes, are marketed as stock-feed. Wheat
plays only a secondary role in South African field crop production and trade (maize
being the primary grain crop). South Africa has traditionally been a deficit producer
and thus an importer of wheat (NDA, 1998; Kirsten et al, 1998). In 1998 though,
59000 tons of wheat were exported out of South Africa; the previous time wheat was
exported was in 1994, the quantity being an insignificant 1000 tons (SAGIS, 1998).
2.2 World Production of Wheat
Table 2.1: World wheat estimates for 1998/99 (million tons)
WHEAT 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 forecast
Production 541 582 609 583
Traded 90 95 95 94
Used 553 578 588 594
Stock 106 110 132 121
Source: Cornelius, 1999
Approximately 600 million tons of wheat are produced annually around the world. Of
that, 90 million tons are traded on the global market (Table 2.1). According to
Luckhoff (1995), it is evident that world production and world stocks, prior to the
1996/97 season, all show signs of a decrease. The world stock in 1995 stood at 104
million tons, which is the lowest since the 1985/86 season. Generally there is an
increasing tendency of total usage of wheat in the world, as consumption increases
annually with the increase in the world population. From the 1995/96 season until the
1997/98 season, the total use of grain in the world increased by 89 million tons. The
7
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Russian
federation
five biggest exporters of wheat in the world are the USA, the EU, Canada, Australia
and Argentina. China, India and Russia also produce large quantities of wheat, but
due to their high domestic consumption levels, are not amongst the largest exporters.
Figure 2.1: Percentage contribution of world wheat production
(Janovsky et al, 1999)
Table 2.2: Income, costs and profit of wheat (Rlha)
Gross Income Subsidies Variable Costs Gross Margin Fixed Costs Net Margin
Argentina 3666.40 0 1449.19 2217.21 504.00 1713.21
Australia 1368.79 0 416.71 952.07 107.64 844.43
Canada 2250.57 54.43 388.08 1862.49 342.93 1519.57
EU 8286.56 1931.47 2679.02 5607.54 2396.46 321l.08
USA 2647.57 0 582.10 2065.47 358.93 1706.55
USA
Rest of world
46%
(SOUTH AFRICA) China
19%
0.25%
India
11%
7%
Source: Cornelius, 1999
8
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With regard to exports, phytosanitary requirements and quality standards must be
adhered to and a Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) certificate must
be obtained.
Table 2.2 gives a general overview of the position of each of the five major producing
countries. The exchange rate taken for these figures was the September 1998 rate of
$1: R4,60.
2.3 Domestic Marketing and Pricing of Wheat
Agricultural marketing policy in South Africa used to be determined by the
Agricultural Marketing Act (Act 59 of 1968 as amended) which enabled the Minister
of Agriculture to proclaim a marketing scheme to control marketing of a particular
commodity. With these schemes, it was possible to transform the agricultural output
and input marketing system and to determine commodity prices, and thus effect the
level and stability of food prices. One of the results of these schemes was invariably
the creation of concentrations of monopoly power, especially in the agricultural
processing industries (Kirsten et al, 1998).
Prior to November 1997, the Wheat Board administered varIOUS statutory
arrangements relating to the marketing of wheat. The various marketing functions
were funded by means of statutory levies. Since November 1997, the price of wheat
has been determined by the interaction between supply and demand thereof.
Producers can sell their produce to anybody in a free market environment. Currently
there is a levy on wheat imports in the form of an import tariff band. The tariff on
imported wheat grain stands at R181.00 perton (Customs and Excise, 1999), with the
consumer bearing the full economic burden.
The 28 percent real devaluation of the Rand, from 1998 to 1999 (R5.00 to R6.40 for
one US$), resulted in a decrease in imports and an increase in the average domestic
price by approximately 20 percent. The following table (Table 2.3) is a representation
of the basic producer prices for BS l-wheat.
9
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Table 2.3: Wheat prices 1993/94-1997/98
SEASON 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
PRODUCER PRlCES 801.48 770.50 846.78 966.02' 904.89
Source: NDA, 1998
2.4 Domestic Production and Consumption of Wheat
Deregulation has made forecasts of wheat production trends difficult. According to
recent surveys by SAGIS (1997/98), the estimated land under wheat production in
South Africa was 1.392 million hectares in 1997 and 0.748 million hectares in 1998.
The yield for the 1997/98 production year was 1.469 million tons of wheat. . The
current annual consumption of wheat in South Africa is estimated at 2.65 million tons
for human consumption, with total consumption of2.759 million tons.
The gross value of wheat production in South Africa for the period from July 1997 to
June 1998 was estimated at R 1 910 million (SAGIS, 1998); another source estimated
this figure as being Rl 786 million, a 26.8 percent decrease from the R2 439 million
of the previous season. (Crops and Markets, 1998; SAGA, 1998).
Plantings, production and yield of wheat in South Africa from 1993/94 to 1997/98,
according to a fourth source, are represented in the table below (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Recent South African wheat statistics
SEASON 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
PLANTINGS (ha) 1064798 1039491 1 363 150 1 293800 1 382300
PRODUCTION (t) 1 975344 1832242 1 968512 2700000 2283500
YIELD (tlha) 1.86 1.76 1.44 2.09 1.65
Source: NDA, 1998
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93/94 94/95 95/96
YEAR
96/97 97/98
Under the current market conditions and due to climatic limitations, South African
wheat production is expected to decrease. In actual fact, it is expected that the total
area planted to wheat for the 1998/99 season will show a reduction of approximately
45 percent, in comparison with the previous season (NDA, 1998).
Figure 2.2: South African Wheat Production 1993/94-1997/98
(NDA Trends in the Agricultural Sector, 1998)
This reduction is mainly due to the anticipated reduction in local prices for wheat,
resulting from relatively low world prices. However, in this connection, it must be
noted that, with the application of the Marrakech agreement of the GATT, the
international wheat price is expected to increase (Goldin et al, 1993). This is
illustrated in Table 2.5 below. However, even if the world price increases, South
African prices will still decline, as they adjust to world price levels in post-
deregulated times, and as the tariff is reduced. Tariffs will, in any case, be reduced
under South Africa's GATT obligations. To date, South Africa has reduced tariffs on
agricultural goods to below the GATT bound rates.
Table 2.5: The potential price effects of GATT on wheat prices in South Africa
(percentage change in 2002)
Commodity Partial Partial Full Full
liberalisation (a) liberalisation (b) liberalisation (a) liberalisation (b)
Wheat + 3.5 + 4.0 + 16.9 +19.0
a) With perfect labour markets
b) With labour market rigidities
Source: Goldin et al, 1993
Il
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Source: Wheat Board, 1997
2.5 Regional Production and Consumption of Wheat
Table 2.6 below provides an overview of past wheat production in the Western Cape.
The consumption of wheat in these regions is also indicated, giving a good estimate of
surplus or shortages of wheat in the country and in the Western Cape.
Table 2.6: The relationship between production and consumption of wheat in
South Africa and that of the Western Cape
YEAR SOUTH AFRICA WESTERN CAPE RESTOFRSA
PROD. CONS. SURP. PROD. CONS. SURP PROD. CONS. SURP.
85/86 1 586 2207 -621 706 313 393 880 1 894 -1 014
86/87 2249 2 143 106 664 306 358 1585 1 837 -252
87/88 3037 2386 651 821 313 508 2216 2073 143
88/89 3490 2351 1 139 692 324 368 2798 2027 771
89/90 1 962 2304 -342 597 333 265 1 365 1 971 -607
90/91 1 666 2 174 -508 456 325 130 1 210 1 849 -638
91/92 2085 2 143 -58 457 332 125 1 628 1 811 -183
92/93 1 270 2 132 -862 582 345 237 688 1 787 -1 099
93/94 1 913 2259 -346 698 368 330 1 215 1 891 -676
94/95 1 773 2353 -580 696 358 338 1 077 1 995 -918
95/96 1 899 2438 -539 776 362 414 1 123 2067 -953
AVE. 2085 2263 -178 650 334 315 1 435 1 928 -493
% of total 31% 14,8% 177% 69% 85,2% 277%
It is expected that the largest decrease in area planted to wheat will occur in the Free
State, where the decrease for the 1998/99 season is expected to be 55 percent (NDA,
1998). Depending on the production in the rest of the country, this could mean a
decrease in the percentage of total production for the Free State of around 13 percent.
12
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Figure 2.3 is a representation ofthe 1997 percentages for total production area divided
between the different provinces. This varies greatly with the graphical representation
of 1998' s percentages for total production area divided between the provinces (Figure
2.4).
Northern
Cape
12%
North West Western
o Cape
7 Yo Northern
Province
3%
Free
Rest
7%
Figure 2.3: Wheat production for 1997 in the South African provinces
(NDA Trends in the Agricultural Sector, 1998).
North West
Northern Cape 9%
12%
Western Cape
37%
Free State
34%
5%
Figure 2.4: Wheat production for 1998 in the South African provinces
(SAGIS, 1998)
Table 2.7 is a recent representation of the wheat industry according to SAGIS which
shows a drastic decrease in the 1998 production for the Free State. It is important to
note that the Free State has in the past produced up to 45 percent of the total supply of
wheat in the RSA (e.g. 1996, 1997), therefore making the Free State the largest and
most important production area in South Africa.
13
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Production V\éstern Eastern r-.bthern Free KVlBZuIu- r-.btl"em ~ Gauterg r-.bth- Tatal
year State V\ést
Q3pe ~ Q3pe Natal Prcwirre 1arYJ8
1994 738 38 365 453 22 48 72 9 95 1840
1995 819 30 278 639 12 14 37 9 130 1008
1900 800 18 345 1217 24 65 78 8 139 2700
1997 555 22 200 1088 21 68 89 16 155 2300
1998 550 7 180 495 20 37 41 9 130 1469
Table 2.7: Wheat production in South Africa according to region, (lOOOt)
Source: SAGIS, 1998
2.6 Conclusion
Adam Smith argued that the source of economic growth lies in specialisation. What
has occurred in the wheat industry in South Africa though, is extensive production of
wheat, either mono-cropping or in the form of mixed farming. Wheat is being grown
on marginal land and many wheat farmers are not diversifying. Good advice for the
farmers would be to spread their risk; 'avoid keeping all one's eggs in one basket'.
In an attempt to spread risk and to ensure survival in a very competitive market, wheat
farmers could produce several different commodities. This is being successfully
implemented in the Koeberg-Malmesbury region in the Western Cape, allowing
farmers to continue wheat farming by creating alternative incomes. The concept of
farming conservatively' to allow for poor seasons is also a concept which guides
farmers in an effort to avoid loss of gross profits. Interference by governments, in the
form of guaranteed prices and drought relief, tends to work against such well-proven
ideas.
1 Farming conservatively means 1) not over-planting when the price is good and then incurring debt
when the price falls 2) marginal land shouldn't be planted for the sole reason that climatic conditions
are favourable, for the follow season could result in disaster.
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Every year there is an exceptionally large carry-over stock, which is mainly the result
of imports, while sufficient local stocks are available in South Africa. This causes an
artificial overproduction! supply situation, which has forced the local wheat price
down by approximately 20 percent in real terms over the past two seasons. Coupled
with fairly sharp increases in input costs (fertiliser, machinery, diesel and seed), this
has impacted negatively on the profitability of wheat production in South Africa.
The distortions that such policies create can be seen throughout the world. A very
clear example is the Western Cape, where too much land is under wheat, and wheat
has entered into dry unsuitable marginal regions. This has in turn led. to the
production of excess wheat that is too expensive to compete on the world market.
With the aid of organisations such as the SA Grain Information Service (SAGIS),
which currently performs the information function (a section 21 company funded by,
amongst others, the Winter Cereal General Trust), and the Winter Grain Producers'
Organisation (WPO), which promotes the interests of winter grain producers at all
levels, South African wheat farmers can co-ordinate production to meet demand and
thereby reduce their surplus.
15
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CHAPTER THREE
DESCRIPTION OF SOME GOVERNMENT POLICIES
AFFECTING THE WHEAT INDUSTRY
IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 Introduction
While free-marketers envision a world without intervention, in the real world
_ governments have to intervene in the economy even if it is only to raise the budgetary
resources needed to carry out the minimum tasks of, for example, provision of police
protection and roads, and other inherently public activities. Taxation of the economic
base is thus the starting point for a government's existence. Wherever that economic
base is primarily agricultural, direct or indirect mechanisms for taxing agricultural
incomes are likely to be essential components of government policy. Even apart from
the need to raise tax revenues, governments intervene in the agricultural price
formation process for a purpose.
South African agriculture has had a long history of governmental intervention, with a
horde of regulations affecting aspects such as prices, use of natural resources, finance,
labour, local and foreign markets, and foreign exchange. This chapter deals with
various policies that affect the South African agricultural sector with particular
reference to the wheat industry as a whole.
3.2 Rationales for Government Intervention in Agriculture
Governments use policy instruments in order to influence economic resource
allocation, such as the level of crop production, the distribution of income, the earning
and expenditure of foreign exchange, and the demand for goods and services. While
some of these objectives can be influenced directly by government expenditure,
administrative action, and legal restrictions, policies which influence price levels and
the change in relative prices also have powerful effects on the way individuals,
families, and firms utilise resources (Harvard Institute, 1991).
16
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The third, and most common rationale for intervention in developing country
agriculture, is the promotion of non-efficiency objectives. Non-efficiency objectives
are those which are geared to improving the social welfare of the majority of the
country's population. The main concern of non-efficiency objectives is 'income
distribution' (Monke & Pearson, 1989).
Of the many reasons for Government intervention in agriculture, a few are more
relevant than the rest in the South African context. According to Timmer (1986),
there are five reasons or rationales, namely: 'contribute to efficient economic growth';
'improve income distribution'; 'ensure a nutritional floor for all citizens'; 'guarantee
food security for the country'; and 'to maintain political stability', which is probably
assured if the first four are achieved. Ohene-Anyang (1997) however, adds
'protection of local industries'. Some of these above rationales are inter-linked and
therefore only four are deemed to have direct a impact in the South African context.
Firstly, a reason for the government imposing policies on the agricultural sector is that
the intervention is believed to accelerate the rate of income growth. Examples of such
interventions which can lead to increased economic activity are: infrastructure
development (roads, water schemes, schools, and medical facilities); and the provision
of public goods (research and development of new technologies).
Secondly, due to market imperfections, the prices of goods or services do not reflect
their true scarcity values because the private sector is unable to develop the
institutions necessary for an efficiently functioning market. Therefore, the
Government takes it upon itself to correct the market failure with policy intervention.
A fourth reason to justify the Government's active role in the agricultural market is
price stabilisation. Market prices can fluctuate substantially from one production
cycle to the next; government policies are created to stem extreme fluctuations.
Examples of schemes that regulate market prices are; international trade controls,
storage schemes, price fixing, and rationing.
17
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3.3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) and Agricultural Issues
South Africa is a co-signatory of the most recent agreement of the WTO (GATT).
The underlying principle of GATT, as far as agricultural production is concerned, is
that Governments of the various member nations should not protect their farmers by
way of subsidies and that world trade should be freely' globalised' . This principle is
meant to let the producer who is most suited to produce a particular commodity (the
producer with a comparative advantage in producing a commodity) do that, in order to
bring about competition and more efficient utilisation of the factors of production
between producers.
The general implications of the Uruguay Round are (Nijhoff, 1987):
• The scaling down of import duties will enhance international market entry for
those industries that derive part of their income from exports.
• .With the scaling down of export subsidies and internal support, international
commodity prices are expected to increase, which will improve the situation of
industries that have a comparative advantage.
• Domestic agricultural prices will correlate increasingly with international prices.
• The benefits obtained by developing countries, in particular through preferential
trade agreements (i.e. Lome Convention, Generalised System of Preferences), will
decrease as countries comply with the general conditions of GATT.
• Some net food importing countries can expect negative effects on the balance of
trade because of increasing international prices and diminishing export subsidies.
• Over the long-term trade liberalisation will result in specialisation, efficiency
gains and increased trade in agriculture.
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• Competition from abroad and increased imports (due to minimum market entry
levels) will put marginal industries and inefficient marketing structures under
pressure.
• Phytosanitary and sanitary measures may require additional investment in physical
and organisational infrastructure in many developing countries; that is, improved
monitoring, inspection procedures and personnel.
The trend of market liberalisation was enhanced by the pressures emerging from the
GATT negotiations for the abolition of quantitative import controls and the
introduction of tariffs on all agricultural commodities. A general policy of tariffs has
been in operation since 1985, but it has only begun to be applied to agricultural
commodities since 1992. One of the major implications of a deregulated marketing
scheme and a liberalised economy is that the farmer, at the production level, is subject
to an environment of intense competition.
One way in which the domestic price of wheat can be influenced is to levy a tariff on
imports of wheat into South Africa. In the past it was possible to restrict the import of
wheat to a particular quantity via our import quota system, and therefore influence the
domestic price. Following the Marrakesh Agreement, the maximum import tariff
percentage is 72 percent, but the South African import tariff for wheat fluctuates
between 15 and 20 percent, and at times decreases to almost zero (Troskie, 1998).
The current tariff on wheat imports is R269/ ton wheat, with a zero tariff on Durum
flour (SAGA, 31 st July 1999).
The major debate regarding the South African wheat tariff, is which means is most
appropriate for its determination. At present a sliding-scale is used, but another
option is the possibility of an ad valorum tariff (Appendix E).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20
3.4 The Main Elements of Agricultural Policy in South Africa
South Africa's agricultural policy is still in the process of change; a phenomenon
which will endure for many years to come. A number of political and economic
pressures have led to a more market-related approach in the marketing of agricultural
commodities in South Africa since the early 1980's. There has been a reduction in the
use of price controls on a number of commodities which includes wheat, as well as
shifts to more market-based pricing systems, away form the old cost-plus pricing
procedure.
The appointment of the Committee oflnquiry into the Marketing Act (CIMA), in June
1992 triggered a process of market deregulation that has been played out since the
beginning of 1993. It had such an impact on the South African agricultural marketing
system, that the wheat board and the wheat marketing scheme, as well as most of the
schemes and marketing boards, were abolished during January 1998 (Kirsten et al,
1998).
Within the land and labour market, there are few overt policy distortions that currently
affect the working of the market and land prices, and wage rates could therefore be
considered a true reflection of the economic costs of resources. Irrigated agriculture
has, however, the benefit of water being subsidised, but this does not include private
irrigation schemes. This is primarily as a result of the pricing structure not taking into
account the capital and full delivery costs in irrigation schemes.
Since policy decisions are aimed at changing resource allocation in the economy, a
first step in policy analysis is to have a clear understanding of the current design of
policy, particularly pricing policy, and the pattern of resource utilisation and
productivity. Agricultural pricing policy (Table 3.1), usually deals with specific,
direct interventions in agricultural markets, such as a tax on commodity exports,
restrictions on input marketing, or a producer or consumer subsidy (Harvard Institute,
1991).
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Table 3.1: Direct Pricing Policy Instruments
POLICY TYPE PRINCIPAL
ECONOMIC EFFECT
MAJOR
INSTRUMENT
Prices of traded goodsSubsidy;
tax on imports/ exports; change; indirect effect on
import/export quota potential tradables;
Indirect effect on prices of
tradables
TRADE POLICIES
Prices of traded goods
change; may lead to
nominal exchange rate
EXCHANG RATE
POLICIES pressure on prices of non-
tradables, e.g. labour.
prices of affected goods
change
rationing; black-market
transactions; or
budgetary costs
subsidies/taxes
MARKET SYSTEM
POLICIES administered prices
minimum wage; land tax changes allocation of
PRODUCTION domestic resources
interest rate or other
subsidies
affect labour/capital mix of
productionINPUT POLICIES
Source: Harvard Institute, 1991
21
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
22
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES TO DETERMINE
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
4.1 Introduction
Viewed as a 'positive' theory, the principle of comparative advantage yields
predictions about the direction of trade and the terms of trade (Eatwell et al, 1987).
According to Samuelson et al, (1992), the principle of 'comparative advantage' holds
that each country will specialise in the production and export of those goods that it
can produce at relatively low cost (in which it is relatively more efficient than other
countries). Conversely, each country will import those goods which it produces at
relatively high cost (in which it is relatively less efficient than other countries).
Proper analysis of the production process and marketing of a commodity, such as
wheat, enables the researcher to determine whether or not the production of that
specific commodity (wheat), in a certain region, will be financially or economically
profitable. Production analysis involves a critical analysis of the input requirements
of the production process as well as the generated outputs. It is possible to determine
whether scarce resources are used efficiently by applying social or economic analysis.
An additional factor is the possibility to justify government agricultural policies and
to determine if policies lead to inefficient resource allocation (Appelyard, 1987;
Leamer, 1984).
4.2 Selection of the Analysis Technique
The rapid growth in computational power in the last three decades has opened new
opportunities for economists to develop disaggregated models to analyse comparative
advantage. There are two broad classes of these models: sectoral and economy-wide.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the sectoral models may be for a single country, a region or
the whole world. The economy-wide models are either general equilibrium models or
growth models (Kendrick, 1990).
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SECTORAL ECONOMY -WIDE
GENERAL
EQUILIBRlUM
Figure 4.1: Comparative Advantage Models
(Kendrick, 1990)
Various techniques in policy analysis could be used to analyse the influence of policy
in the wheat industry; but only the more popular techniques are considered below.
Such techniques include:
Sectoral
the stochastic coefficient regression method
the conventional gravity model
partial equilibrium methodologies
Economy-wide
general equilibrium model
These approaches all have their advantages and shortcomings. A positive concept is
to choose the approach which fits the study objective and has the least disadvantages
or shortcomings, but still produces accurate results.
4.2.1 Stochastic Coefficient Regression Method
The stochastic coefficient regression method has been used effectively in policy
analysis of wheat economies (Gempesaw & Halbrent, 1990). Conventionally, dummy
variables are used in standard fixed coefficient estimating methods such as ordinary
23
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least squares (OLS), to capture policy impacts on the structure of a sector. However,
some limitations are encountered when using this conventional approach. The first
problem is the difficulty in defining the stages of the policy's impact; that is, the exact
timing of when the policies are announced, when they are in full effect, and how they
are fine-tuned. Secondly, the fixity of agricultural assets and inelastic supply and
demand contrast with the abrupt shocks that occur when dummy variables are used.
Thirdly, a fixed coefficient estimation method assumes constancy in the marginal
contribution of causal factors, which is restrictive when evaluating the impacts of
evolving policies.
4.2.2 Gravity Model
The gravity model is a reduced form equation from general equilibrium of demand
and supply systems. It has been used to evaluate bilateral trade flows of aggregate
commodity between pairs of countries. This model is able to evaluate the impacts of
trade policies on trade flows (Karemera et aI, 1991).
4.2.3 Partial Equilibrium Methodologies
Partial equilibrium analysis is a technique of microeconomic analysis pioneered
principally by Cournot and Marshall to analyse a market, or other part of an economy,
by itself. Usually the relationship between only two variables is considered, with the
assumption that if something can influence that relationship, it remains unchanged.
A central part of theoretical efforts in the field of policy analysis has been the search
for the theoretically correct and easily understandable summary measures of policy
impacts on social welfare. Two types of summary measures have been developed.
One strand of analysis focuses on private and social costs of public sector investment.
Popular measures in this area include the net present value (NPV), and the economic
internal rate of return (EIRR). The second strand of analysis focuses on the static
effects of price-distorting policies. Popular measures of the effects of price policies
include the effective protection coefficient (EPC) and the domestic resource cost of
foreign exchange (DRC) (Nelson & Panggabean, 1991).
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4.2.3.1 Net present value
The net present value (NPV) is the discounted value of future mcome from a
particular investment less the discounted value of expected costs. A positive net
present value indicates that an investment project is worthwhile (Rutherford, 1992).
4.2.3.2 Economic internal rate of return
The internal rate of return is the discount rate that makes the net present value of an
investment project equal to zero. This is a widely used method of investment
appraisal, as it takes into account the timing of cash flows (Ramsey, 1970; Rutherford,
1992). In cost-benefit analysis it is measured by the formula:
n J
L Bj - Cj / (1+.i)
j=O
Where: = the internal rate of return
4.2.3.3 Domestic Resource Cost Analysis
D~mestic Resource Cost (DRC) is the opportunity cost of using a factor of production
to produce one unit of output, divided by the international value added by producing
that unit. The concept of DRC relates to a measure of real opportunity cost in terms
of total domestic resources, of producing (or saving) a net marginal unit of foreign
exchange. The DRC analysis follows a four-step model:
1) Development of enterprise budgets
2) Pricing of inputs and outputs
3) Calculation of resource cost ratios, and a
4) Sensitivity analysis
DRC's will always have their limitations, and there is a danger with using partial
equilibrium methodologies, as these are summary measures, and important results of
the analysis may go unnoticed. For example, the indicators provide information on
which activities are the most efficient users of inputs, and given certain prices, the
25
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most profitable. It is not known whether some prices will change after farmers switch
into a particular activity, potentially affecting the relative efficiency of the activity.
Another important point is that the opportunity costs of domestic resources are a
function of current policy. Thus, these opportunity costs are only relevant under a
particular set of policy constraints, i.e. they are constrained second best equilibrium
values. If policy was to change, so would opportunity costs. For this reason, the
PAM is not wholly satisfactory in terms of economic theory, being based on a partial
equilibrium rather than a general equilibrium approach (Masters & Winter-Nelson,
1995; Yao, 1997).
4.2.3.4 The Nominal Protection Coefficient
The NPe is an old measure of comparative advantage, dating back to Adam Smith,
who used it to compare the market prices and social opportunity costs of wheat. The
NPe is defined as the ratio of observed market price paid to producers of a given
product and its social (shadow) or world reference price (Masters, 1994).
I NPe = Px I Px*
(2)
Where: Px =market price of produce x
Px* = social (shadow) price of produce x
4.2.3.5 The Effective Protection Coefficient
The EPe is defined as the ratio of value added in local prices (V) to the value added
in world prices (V*), where Vand V* are defined as revenue minus the sum of all
tradable input costs measured in local and world prices respectively (Masters, 1994).
EPe = V I V* = (PxQx - PiQi) I (Px*Qx - Pi*Qi)
Where: Px =market price of produce x
Qx = quantity of produce x
Pi =market price of tradable inputs
Qi = quantity of tradable inputs
Px* = world price of produce x
Pi* =world price of tradable inputs
26
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Since the PAM is not a behavioural model, it cannot be used to calculate the new
quantities of outputs and inputs that would follow from other alternative prices (such
as those resulting from policy changes). The input-output physical budget is itself the
product of past adjustment to actual market prices. Furthermore, the PAM tells only
the relative incentives for change, without measuring the magnitude of the change
(Nelson & Panggabean, 1991).
An EPC greater than one means that private profits are higher than they would have
been without commodity policies, and an EPC less than one indicates that private
profitability is lower than it would have been without the commodity policies. The
DRC is used as an alternative measure to the effective rate of protection / (effective
protection coefficient).
4.2.3.6 Policy Analysis Matrix
The PAM is the intellectual successor to the DRC and NPV calculations, and typically
uses fixed input-output coefficients, so it is not possible to use it directly to indicate
producer or consumer responses to policy changes that reduce distortions. This
technique is similar to a costlbenefit analysis approach to comparative advantage
studies; the difference is that the PAM considers the government policy effects on
different farmers [i.e. an efficient farmer using imported specialised machinery pays
substantial import tariffs, while the average farmer benefits by using typical
techniques and not employing entrepreneurial abilities (Customs and Excise, 1999)]
In such cases, the social cost for the efficient farmer varies from that of the average
farmer, and this is the reasoning behind the necessity of a PAM in place of a
cost/benefit analysis (Monke & Pearson, 1989).
Nevertheless, the methods and indicators have the advantage of being relatively easy
to calculate using obtainable data. They enable easily interpretable and consistent
comparative ranking of different productive activities within and across regions. The
snapshot that emerges is a much better appreciation of the efficiency of agricultural
resource use than obtained from other methodologies (Delgado et al, 1997).
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4.3 The Policy Analysis Matrix: a detailed discussion
4.2.4 General Equilibrium Model
The general equilibrium model is a pragmatic, indicative approach to policy, which
recognises that practitioners of policy analysis will only rarely have the data or the
time to construct a fully specified general equilibrium model, capable of generating
useful estimates of opportunity costs under different policy scenarios. Mathematically
they are systems of simultaneous non-linear equations. Examples of general
equilibrium models are: the SAM style models; Johansen Style models; and
comparative advantage of general equilibrium models (Kydd et al, 1996; Kendrick,
1990).
The PAM has been selected to model comparative advantage in the wheat industry of
the Western Cape because it has been designed to deal specifically with measuring the
impact of policy on the economics of agricultural production. Since policies may
impact on both output markets, and the market for production inputs, the PAM is a
useful way to identify sources of policy transfers and inefficiency of resources, and to
measure their cumulative effects on a commodity system.
The Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) is a logical framework for policy analysis
developed during the late 1970's and early 1980's by Scott Pearson of the Food
Research Institute, Stanford University, and explained in detail in Monke and Pearson
(1989). The PAM grew out of a history of policy analysis using the domestic
resource cost approach.
The basis of the PAM is a set of profit and loss identities that are familiar to any
businessman. A strong point of the PAM is that it allows for varying disaggregation.
Another is that it makes the analysis of policy-induced transfers straightforward. The
PAM makes it possible to identify the net effect of a set of complex and contradictory
policies and to sort out the individual effects of those policies.
A reason why the PAM has attracted much attention from agricultural policy
specialists is that it is appropriate to circumstances in which the framework of
28
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economic policy affecting agriculture is in flux. Such examples include policy
changes which affect real exchange rates, real interest rates, input and output
subsidies and taxes, border measures and marketing institutions (Kydd et ai, 1997;
Nelson & Panggabean, 1991).
With the PAM it is possible to identify, in an approximate fashion, which of a
country's existing portfolio of commodity systems is likely to be negatively or
positively affected by policy reforms, in terms of incomes and viability for the
individuals in the system.
Furthermore, the PAM can be used to help in focusing technology development on the
problems that have been identified. For example, it would be a major concern if a
PAM revealed that policy changes were likely to undermine the viability of an
existing commodity system on which a substantial population depended. By applying
sensitivity analysis to the PAM for this system, it is possible to examine whether any
achievable changes in the technological characteristics of the systems might restore
viability (Nelson & Panggabean, 1991).
4.4 Construction of the PAM
The PAM is a tool consisting of two accounting identities. The first accounting
identity states that profit is equal to revenue minus costs, measured in either private or
social terms. The second identity (found in the third row of Table 4.1) measures the
differences between observed values and the levels that would exist if the divergences
between private and social prices (caused by distorting policies or market failures)
were removed.
The two accounting identities generate policy indicators for which values can be
estimated. Notable among these are the nominal protection coefficient, effective
protection coefficient, private cost ratio and domestic resource cost ratio (these are
discussed below). The following table gives a representation of how the PAM is
typically organised.
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Table 4.1: The policy analysis matrix to measure policy incentives and
comparative advantage
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) Prices A=:EPxQx B =:E PiQi C =:E PjQj D
Social (shadow) Prices E= :EPx*Qx F=:EPi*Qi G =:E Pj*Qj H
Policy effect (divergences) I J K L
Where:
Px = market price of produce x
Qx = quantity of produce x
Pi = market price of tradable inputs
Qi = quantity of tradable inputs
Px* = world price of produce x
Pi* = world price of tradable inputs
1. Private profits, D, equals A minus B minus C
2. Social profits, H, equals E minus F minus G
3. Output transfers, I, equals A minus E
4. Input transfers, J, equals B minus F
5. Factor transfers, K, equals C minus G
6. Net transfers, L, equals D minus H; or I minus J minus K
Source: Monke & Pearson, 1989
The PAM has four columns: the first for revenue, the second and third for costs and
the fourth for profitability. The two cost columns are differentiated into a column for
tradable inputs and a column for domestic factors or non-tradable inputs.
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If policies by the government to correct market failure do not exist (or are negligible),
any differences between the first and second rows must be a result of distorting
policies. The third row also reflects transfers between producers on one side, and
government treasury and consumers on the other side. Under certain restrictive
assumptions, transfers to producers are identical to producer surplus and transfers to
consumers are identical to consumer surplus.
There are three rows in the PAM: the top row of the matrix is a budget showing costs
of production and marketing at market prices; the second row in the matrix shows the
same cost elements expressed at social prices, that is, social opportunity costs. For
tradable products, adjusted world prices are normally taken as social prices, applying
import or export parity measures where appropriate. The social price of domestic
resources is taken as their opportunity cost, in other words, the return at the margin in
the best available alternative.
The third row of the PAM is simply the first row minus the second. It shows the net
impact of market failure, distorting policies, and efficient policies (those which
correct market failure). The signs of the revenue and cost terms in the third row
indicate whether the net effects of policy and market imperfections for these
categories amount to an implicit subsidy or tax. If, for example, (I) was positive, the
net effect of policy and/ or market failure is that the market price paid to the system is
in excess of the social opportunity cost, i.e. output prices are subsidised. The right-
hand entry in the third row, (L), summarises the net effect of policy and/ or market
failures on the profitability of the system, known as 'net transfers'. If (D) is greater
than (H), then the net effect of policy is to subsidise the system. In this case, policy
reforms, to bring about greater economic efficiency, will reduce the gap between (D)
and (H), and this will induce adjustments in the commodity system in question. This
may involve changes in the proportions in which resources are used and, at least in the
short term, some contraction in the scale of operation (Kydd et ai, 1996; Ohene-
Anyang, 1997).
A major advantage of the PAM as an analytical tool, is the way it simplifies the
analysis down to the essentials. For example, the difference between private output
prices (A) and social output prices (E) is transfers resulting from policies affecting
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output prices (I). Thus, the analysis is focused on the divergence between private and
social prices and it is not strictly necessary to know precisely which policies are
causing these effects (although it is obviously desirable to understand this).
The PAM measures two kinds of profits: private profits; which are measured in
market prices, and social profits, which are measured in economic prices. The two are
discussed below.
4.4.1 Private profitability
The term private refers to revenues and costs reflecting the actual market pnce
received or paid by farmers, merchants, or processors in the agricultural system. The
private, or actual market price, thus incorporates the underlying economic costs and
valuations, plus the effects of all policies and market failures (Monke & Pearson,
1989).
Private profitability is the criterion used by farmers to assess and compare alternative
plans open to them for exploiting resources at their disposal. Prices paid and received
by farmers, however, do not reflect the economic (or social) cost of resources used
and products generated, because of various market distortions and other restrictions
on prices and trade, commonly imposed by government agencies for various purposes.
Choices made by individual producers, therefore, may not correspond to the social
optima and could lead to inefficient allocation of the country's resources (Ohene-
Anyang, 1997).
With reference to Table 4.1, private profits (D) are the difference between revenues
(A) and costs (B+C); all four entries in the top row are measured in observed prices.
The calculation begins with the construction of separate budgets for farming,
marketing, and processing (Figure 4.2). For the purpose of data collection and
organisation, the PAM framework defines a commodity system to include four
activities: - farm production, delivery from farm to processor, processing, and
delivery from processor to the wholesale market. Figure 4.2 illustrates the structure of
the commodity system model.
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Figure 4.2: The Structure of the commodity system for PAM analysis
(Monke and Pearson, 1989)
For a study such as this, where the producer is the important factor that is being
analysed, only two activities come into play, namely the 'Farm Production' and
'Producer to Processor' activities. Through this form of analysis, a PAM is given for
the commercial farming of wheat in the Western Cape, and not a PAM for the
Western Cape wheat industry itself.
ACTIVITIES
FARM PRODUCTION
- inputs and outputs for production of raw
materials; evaluation stops at farm gate
+
FARM- TO-PROCESSOR
- commodity moved from farm gate to
processing site (may include storage and
handling as well as transportation costs)
+
PROCESSING
- commodity processed into consumer-
acceptable form (may involve physical
transformation or just packing, handling, and
quality control)
+
PROCESSOR- TO-
WHOLESALE MARKET
- commodity moved from processing site to
market, where domestic activity IS
comparable to tradable product (may include
inputs and outputs for farm-to-wholesale
market if processing activity is irrelevant)
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4.4.2 Social profitability
The second row of the accounting matrix utilises social prices. Social profitability is
obtained by deducting the social costs from the social revenue. Efficient outcomes
are achieved when an economy's resources are used in activities that create the
highest levels of outputs and income. These valuations measure comparative
advantage or efficiency in the agricultural commodity system. This is due to the
measurement of inputs and outputs with scarcity values or social opportunity costs
being taking into consideration in the calculation of social profits. Therefore, the
social profit can be used as an accurate indicator of comparative advantage (Monke &
Pearson, 1989).
4.4.3 Effects of divergences
Divergences, which are always the result of either distorting policies or market
failures, cause private valuations to depart from their social counterparts.
Governments usually enact distorting policies to favour particular interest groups or
with the intention of ensuring income distribution and food security. Similarly,
certain markets may fail to bring about an efficient allocation of goods or services.
The PAM provides indicators that conveniently measure the effects of various policies
on agricultural production. If market failures are unimportant, these transfers measure
mainly the effects of distorting policy (Monke & Pearson, 1989; Ohene-Anyang,
1997).
The following sub-sections provide brief descriptions of these divergences.
4.4.3.1 Output Transfers
I I= A-E = (L: Px Qx) - (L:Px*Qx)
An output transfer, I, is defined as the difference between the actual market price of a
commodity produced by an agricultural system, A, and the efficiency valuation for
that commodity, E (Monke & Pearson, 1989).
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When the output transfer of a commodity has a positive value, it means the various
policies increase private prices of the commodity over the corresponding world prices.
A positive output transfer is an incentive to private farmers, since it causes the
production system to realise higher private profit or cover greater private costs than it
would without the aid of the policies. A negative output transfer implies lower private
output prices compared to the corresponding world prices, and hence a disincentive to
private farmers (Ohene-Anyang, 1997).
4.4.3.2 Tradable-input transfers
(5)
I J= B-F = (L Pi Qi) - (LPi*Qi)
The tradable-input transfers, J, are defined as the difference between the total costs of
the tradable inputs valued in private prices, B, and the total costs of the same inputs
measured in social prices, F (Monke & Pearson, 1989).
The principles underlying the interpretation of tradable-input transfers are equivalent
to those set out for output transfers. World prices serve as social valuations of all
tradable inputs. Non-tradable inputs are decomposed into their component tradable-
input and primary factor costs to permit social valuation. A positive tradable input
transfer serves as a disincentive to private farmers, since it indicates higher private
prices of tradable inputs than the corresponding world prices. This means a positive
tradable-input transfer can rather make a production process socially profitable, but
privately unprofitable. These transfers may be the result of policies such as import
restriction (for imported products) or taxes on domestic consumption of those goods.
To reduce input costs, a government can subsidise importables, restrict exportables by
imposing export taxes or quotas, or subsidise all domestic consumption of the input
item (Ohene-Anyang, 1989).
4.4.3.3 Domestic factor transfer
I K= C-G = (L Pj Qj) - (LPj*Qj)
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Domestic factor transfer is defined as the difference between the cost of all the
domestic factors employed in a production process, measured in actual market prices,
and the social costs of these factors (Monke & Pearson, 1989). These transfers are
disincentives to private farmers, since they reduce private profits, but negative
domestic factor transfers increase private profits and are therefore incentives to
private farmers.
4.4.3.4 Net policy effects
IL=D-H
The value of L shows the extent of inefficiency in an agricultural system. If market
failures are a large source of the net transfer, this measure indicates how much long-
term government effort (price policy, investment, and regulation) will be required to
eventually permit the economy to operate efficiently (Monke & Pearson, 1989).
4.5 Indicators in the PAM
The basic PAM permits twelve indicators of economic efficiency, six of which are
ratio indicators and six non-ratio indicators. Ratio measures are more useful for
comparison of commodity systems, which are dissimilar in the relative proportions in
which they use inputs (Kydd et al, 1996).
Selected indicators derived from the PAM include:
4.5.1 Resource Cost Ratio
The domestic resource cost (DRC) measures in one ratio the telationship between the
true cost of producing an item and the return to selling it. The DRC is equal to the
value of domestic inputs used, priced using social prices, divided by product revenues
at social prices less the cost of tradable inputs priced at social prices.
(8)
I DRC = G / (E-F)
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A DRC value less than one indicates that the opportunity cost of the domestic
resources used is less than the value added that is earned from the sale of those
resources. Comparing across activities, the one with the lowest DRC is the one that
earns the most value with the least value of inputs.
4.5.2 Nominal Protection Coefficient on Outputs
The second indicator is the nominal protection coefficient on outputs (NPCO). The
NCPO indicates the extent to which the market price differs from the social price.
(9)
I NPCO = AlE
By definition, an NCPO above unity indicates that producers of that good enjoy a
price premium that represents a financial transfer from consumers of the good to its
producers. An NCPO below unity would indicate a transfer from producers to
consumers. These transfers occur because of government policies or market
imperfections that cause the market price to differ from the economic price.
4.5.3 Nominal Protection Coefficient on Inputs
The third indicator is the nominal protection coefficient on inputs (NPCl). The NPCI
is the ratio of the private price of inputs to their social price.
I NPCI= B IF
Like the NCPO, the NCPI measures financial transfers caused by government policies
of market imperfection. The NCPI measures the extent to which the market price of
tradable inputs exceeds their social price. An NCPI above unity indicates that
smallholders undertaking that activity pay a premium for their tradable inputs.
4.5.4 Effective Protection Coefficient
The fourth indicator is the effective protection coefficient (EPC). This indicator
measures the effects of policies and market imperfections that affect the market for
outputs and tradable input. It measures the divergence between the value added by
domestic inputs as measured with private prices and that measured with social prices.
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(11)
I EPC = (A-B) / (E-F) I
Value added by domestic inputs is product revenue minus costs paid for tradable
inputs. An EPC greater than unity indicates that the profitability of an activity, given
current policy and market conditions, exceeds what it would be if subsidies or other
such distortions were removed. The EPC indicates whether policy and market
conditions for both outputs and purchased inputs have created an incentive or
disincentive to undertake an activity.
4.5.5 Profitability Coefficient
The fifth indicator is the profitability coefficient (PC). The PC is the ratio of the
profit from an activity measured with private prices to that measured with social
pnces.
(12)
I PC =D/H
Like the EPC, the PC measures the extent to which policy or market conditions have
created an incentive or disincentive to undertake an activity. Unlike the EPC, the PC
includes variation between private and social prices of non-tradable inputs.
4.5.6 Subsidy Ratio to Producers
The sixth and last indicator is the subsidy ratio to producers (SRP). The SRP
measures the premium producers receive by undertaking a certain activity in relation
to the social price or value of a good.
I SRP = L / E = (D-H) / E
The SRP is a measurement of the profits derived from a financial transfer from
consumers of a good to its producers.
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4.6 Conclusion
Although the PAM is appropriately designed for this study, it is a static model that
cannot capture the potential changes in prices and productivity, and the results are
subject to changes in market conditions. To overcome the limitations, a set of
sensitivity analyses should be conducted (Yao, 1997).
The choice of the PAM model requires particular theory pertaining to the structure of
the model; this was dealt with in Chapter Four, but important theory, with respect to
certain concepts, still needs defining. Concepts such as market and economic prices,
shadow pricing and conversion factors will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGIES FOR THE CALCULATION OF
EFFICIENCY PRICES
5.1 Introduction
Accurate estimation of shadow prices of inputs and outputs is critically important in
the use of the PAM, because these prices represent the opportunity cost of the inputs
and outputs to the economy. This means that they make it possible to identify the
contribution each commodity makes to the national income.
This chapter describes the methodologies used in the calculation of shadow prices for
the inputs and outputs found in the study area budgets.
5.2 Market prices
Market prices are those perceived pnces at which products and services trade,
irrespective of interference in the market; for example, the market wages of labour,
the price of 2kg of maize meal, the price of 1 kilowatt-hour of electricity, etc. The
market prices in the study area budgets were ascertained from the data obtained at the
various district co-operatives, from the September 1998 COMBUD results, and from
individuals operating in the industry.
5.3 Shadow prices
Shadow prices are the opportunity costs of products and services when the market
price, for whatever reason, does not reflect these costs. Examples are: shadow wages
of labour, where the fact that minimum wages are fixed is taken into account; a
shadow price for fuel, where taxes and subsidies are excluded; the marginal cost of
generating one kilowatt-hour of electricity, etc. (CEAS, 1989).
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5.3.1 Principles in the Calculation of Shadow Prices
There are various means of calculating shadow prices, but three stand out from the
rest. The first is the world price approach, the second is the opportunity cost
approach, and the third important approach rests on the willingness of the community
or groups in the community to pay for goods or services. This last approach of
willingness-to-pay is recommended only as a method of calculating surrogate prices
under certain circumstances, for example, the valuation of externalities; it is the first
two approaches that form the basis of shadow price calculation, and so they alone will
be discussed (CEAS, 1989).
5.3.1.1 World price approach
The world price approach takes into account world prices of products and services,
especially with regard to those goods that are freely traded on international markets.
Such goods include agricultural and mineral products, for which an active free
international market exists.
The world price is used as a shadow price when the local market prices have been
distorted through government intervention or market irregularities / failures.
Adjustments are made to the world price, with respect to import or export costs, and
then the final parity price/ is used as the shadow price.
A problem with the reliability of this approach is that firstly, the scarcity value of a
currency is not always reflected, due to the government pegging the currency at an
artificial level. Adjustments are then required in the value of the currency. Secondly,
certain inputs, such as labour, cannot necessarily be converted to a currency value.
The reason for this is that no free international market exists for such inputs, and
therefore it is impossible to attach a currency value to surplus labour (CEAS, 1989).
5.3.1.2 Opportunity cost approach
This approach follows the general principle behind opportunity cost, namely, the
production that is given up elsewhere, by withdrawing the relevant inputs for
alternative use, is used as the shadow price of those inputs. The value used for the
2 Parity pricing is the concept of adding the cost of delivery/ transport of a good to a certain market, to
the cost of production (Harvard Institute, 1991).
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5.3.2 General Problems with the Determination of Shadow Prices
Shadow prices should be determined as scientifically as possible, so that different
evaluators can achieve the same results (CEAS, 1989). Therefore, it is important to
deal with, and record the manner in which externalities, inflation, taxation and
subsidies, and the value of currency, will be handled.
shadow price of outputs is the additional benefit achieved by undertaking a certain
project relative to the second best project.
Due to various problems or shortcomings with both the world price and opportunity
cost approaches, a combined approach would calculate shadow prices more
accurately. For example, the output shadow price for wheat on the Western Cape
market would be the parity price achieved from the world price, whereas the input
shadow price for labour in the Western Cape wheat industry would be the opportunity
cost of that input if used in another sector; i.e. the possible wage that could be earned
if that unit of labour was in another industry. This combined approach provides a
more precise and flexible process of shadow price determination and eliminates the
disadvantages of each of the world price and opportunity cost approaches.
5.3.2.1 Externalities
External effects are costs or benefits not reflected fully in decision-making or lil
prices. Since all 'market failures' are a result of a divergence of private and social
costs or benefits, all 'market failures' may be viewed in some sense as externalities.
In practice, most external effects reflect the high cost of running a market, because
those who would benefit from some action do not pay for the benefit, either because:
(l) - for technological reasons it is too difficult to collect from potential payers, or
(2) - the absence of ownership or other legal barriers does not allow collection of
payments for provision of the good (Zerbe & Dively, 1994).
5.3.2.2 Currency
The price of any imported product or mineral is converted by means of an exchange
rate to internal price levels. Irrespective of restrictions on the flow of capital, the
commercial Rand is fairly representative of the forces of supply and demand, as
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determined by imports and exports, and is therefore used as the shadow price of
currency.
Other reasons for using the commercial Rand as the shadow price of currency is due
to the highly complicated ways of calculating a shadow exchange rate which involves
the difference between two currencies and leads to much uncertainty. Two methods
are used in calculating a shadow exchange rate, namely the 'Big Mac' index and the
'BER' method to calculated the purchasing-power parity (PPP) exchange rate
between the US dollar and the Rand. These calculations of exchange rate need not be
dealt with as wheat is not exported from the Western Cape to other countries,
therefore the shadow exchange rate does not playa role in this study.
5.3.2.3 Inflation
Inflation is the continued rise in general price levels that makes the determination of
relative scarcity values more difficult (Appendix A.I). Inflation is not taken into
account in the economic analysis, and all evaluations are done in base year prices,
with allowance for relative price shifts.
5.3.2.4 Indirect taxes and subsidies
Indirect taxes (e.g.: income tax) and subsidies are transfer payments, and when new
inputs that have to be taxed or subsidised, are looked at in the national interest, the
value is calculated from the point of view of the producer, by subtracting taxes and
adding subsidies. When the effect on the local economy has to be taken into account,
the market prices, including the taxes and after deducting subsidies, indicate the social
marginal value of the input or benefit. All indirect taxation is excluded in the
financial analysis, but direct taxation (e.g.: value added tax) is taken into account in
the economic analysis.
5.3.2.5 Adjustment for direct transfer payments
Transfer payments are levies such as value added tax (vat), which applies to imports
as well as domestic production. They are also payments for resources (inputs) used in
production. These payments are taken into consideration in this thesis, as they
represent a policy distortion influencing the cost structure of the enterprise budgets,
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5.4 Shadow pricing tradable commodities
but they are not included in the financial and economic analysis. The reasoning for
this is given below.
The current statutory levy on winter cereal is R4.50 per metric ton and serves to
finance information and research. It came into operation on the 1st of October 1998
and will lapse on the so" of September 2002. The consumer bears the whole
economic burden. The consumer's burden increases as the demand curve becomes
relatively more elastic, while the burden decreases when the demand curve becomes
relatively more inelastic (Seitz et al, 1994).
This thesis is concerned with the calculation of the productivity of commercial wheat
farming and vat on inputs is claimed back by commercial farmers from the
government, but the value added to the inputs is taxed at a rate of 14 percent. The
farmer is therefore affected by this policy distortion in that vat is payable equal to 14
percent of the producers nett income.
At the end of each two-month period vat is claimable from the receiver of revenue on
purchased inputs. Inputs purchased from co-operatives by vat registered producers do
not have vat included (e.g.: fertiliser, chemicals, and fuel), but some inputs purchased
elsewhere carry the 14 percent vat (e.g.: vehicles). This vat is subtracted from the vat
payable by the producer. The vat payable is equal to 14 percent of the producer's
gross receipts.
The argument against including this policy distortion into the PAM, revolves around
the theory that the vat paid by the producer to the government is money that was
never the producer's. As stated above, the consumer bears the entire vat burden. In a
situation of zero value added taxation, the producer would receive the same gross
receipts as in the current situation, and not the 14 percent increase caused by vat.
The social price, or shadow price, of a tradable input or output is generally its trade
parity price (Harvard Institute, 1991). Tradable goods, by definition, have border
pnces. The goods produced by a commodity system are usually tradable, so the
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shadow prices for the 'revenues' column in the PAM, as well as the 'tradable inputs'
column, are usually easy to compute. Tradable goods may be divided into four
categories:
Exported output
Diverted export
Import substitutes
Imported and importable inputs
5.4.1 Exported output
The price is the FOB (free on board) value of commodities actually exported. If the
small country assumption' does not hold, and the country's sales volume affects the
international price, the shadow price is the marginal export price. This category is not
applicable in this study.
5.4.2 Diverted export
The price is the FOB value of commodities that would be exported, if they were not
used as inputs elsewhere in the domestic economy. This category is not applicable in
this study.
5.4.3 Import substitutes
The price is the Clf (cost, insurance, and freight) value of commodities that would be
imported, if there were no domestic production by the commodity system. This
category is applicable in this study.
5.4.4 Imported and importable inputs
The price is the Clf value of imported goods used by the commodity system to
produce outputs, or of importable goods similar to domestic goods used in the same
fashion. This category is applicable in this study.
South Africa is a net importer of wheat. The import parity price of wheat at the
various producing areas is therefore used to calculate the social revenue of wheat. In
3 If a country's world market share for a commodity is too small to have any significant effect on the
world price, the shadow price is the export parity price using world prices.
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calculating the parity price, the world pnce IS used, due to the small country
assumption (South Africa's share of the world wheat market is too small to have any
significant effect on the world price).
The shadow price of imported inputs, such as herbicides, is calculated using the
purchase price (CIF) minus the applicable percentage import tariff. For herbicides
this would mean the CIF price minus the 10percent import tariff.
5.5 Shadow pricing non-traded commodities
The social price of a non-tradable input or output is generally its domestic equilibrium
price net of distorting policy influences (Harvard Institute, 1991).
5.5.1 Capital Goods
Capital goods are those production inputs that are not used up in a single period in the
production process.
The cost of capital for the producer is the annual amount paid to the bank for long-
term loans on capital goods. This cost is greatly affected by the nominal interest rate
charged on the sum loaned. The shadow price for the cost of capital is calculated
subjectively through the determination of the real interest rate.
The calculation of the real interest rate is subjective. Simplistically seen, this figure
would be the inflation rate combined with the long-term real interest rate. The current
South African inflation rate is 2.9 percent. The current long-term real interest rate
should be between 2 and 4 percent but lies between 8 and 10percent. Therefore
taking the maximum possibilities for a real interest rate would result in a figure of 13
percent, which is around 4 percent below the current nominal interest rate of 16
percent (SARB, 1999).
This nominal interest rate can be attributed to one of two causes. The first is the
action of government and the second the action of market forces. Were the cause to
be the action of government regulation (the Reserve Bank intervening by targeting
interest rates for regulation of the economy), then this phenomenon must be included
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in this thesis due to it being a policy distortion. On the other hand, were the cause a
result of market forces, then the social cost of capital would the same as the private
cost of capital due to the nominal interest rate being a direct result of market
tendencies.
This argument is subjective, yet the fact that the South African economy is in
transition, and that interest rates therefore reflect a political premium, leads to the
conclusion that market forces dominate.· Therefore, the private and social cost of
capital is calculated using the nominal interest rate, hence they are the same.
For the purpose of this study, capital goods are divided into three groups (CEAS,
1989):
Land
Buildings
Machinery and equipment
5.5.1.1 Land
The market price of a given piece of land cannot simply be accepted as a measure of
its scarcity. The inherent value of land is dependent on its physical characteristics, the
climate, and the production technology used on it. The shadow price of land is based
on its opportunity cost, in other words, the optimal alternative use to which it can be
put. In order to calculate this price, the following information must be available:
i) the historical use of the land;
ii) the value of the output derived from it in the past; and
iii) the developments in the area which can effect it.
5.5.1.2 Buildings
In order to determine prices correctly, the following information is necessary:
i) the date on which the building was built;
ii) the current building cost of an equivalent building (book value); and
iii) alternative applications of the building
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5.5.1.3 Machinery and equipment
Depreciation is taken into account indirectly, in that the cost of fixed assets normally
appears at the beginning of the analysis period, and the scrap or residual value appears
as a credit at the end. The shadow price of machinery and equipment is determined in
the same way as that of raw materials.
5.5.2 Raw Materials
Raw materials are found in a variety of forms, and are converted through a variety of
processes, by the addition of labour and capital, into goods and services. The shadow
price of the raw material depends on a number of factors:
i) it cannot simply be accepted that the market price reflects the relative scarcity
of a diminishing raw material e.g. coal; for the government often influences
the price for other reasons;
ii) monopolies could force a raw material price up to an artificial level that is
higher than the scarcity value;
iii) subsidising or taxing the use of raw materials will distort the prices so that
they no longer reflect scarcity values; and
iv) rationing restricts the demand for, or supply of, certain goods, and distorts the
market prices so that economic value is not reflected in the price.
5.5.3 Labour
Factors exist in the labour market that result in the labour wage not reflecting relative
scarcity. One such example is the fixing of minimum wages; this forces the wage
above the marginal product of labour, and thus limits employment. The shadow price
of labour for this study on the Western Cape wheat industry will follow the
opportunity cost approach; the shadow price is the best alternative employment
possibility in the immediate region.
5.5.4 Services
Purchased services are not always visible in the final product that is produced, but
nevertheless form an integral part of the production process, e.g. electricity, water,
transport, research and development. The opportunity cost of such services is the
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value that the rest of the community has to forgo if they are denied the service, or the
cost imposed on them to deliver the service (CEAS, 1989)
5.6 Conclusion
The use of shadow prices is essential for this study, because all the indicators of
comparative advantage and policy incentives which are calculated from the PAM
require the use of both financial and economic prices. The shadow prices make it
possible to identify the effects of problematic agricultural policies that hinder
production and the marketing of agricultural goods in South Africa.
The next chapter, Chapter Six, deals with the application and results derived from the
Policy Analysis Matrix.
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CHAPTER SIX
APPLICATION AND RESULTS OF THE POLICY
ANALYSIS MATRIX
6.1 Introduction
The approach used in PAM analysis begins with the calculation of existing levels of
private (actual market) and social (efficiency) revenues, costs, and profits. This
calculation reveals the extent to which actual profits are generated by policy transfers,
rather than by underlying economic efficiency.
6.2 Data selection
The selection and verification of data is probably the single most important issue in
this type of study. In order to compile a comprehensive and worthwhile study,
accurate and representative data must be used. However, resources are scarce, and
hard decisions have to be made about the exact data to be used.
6.2.1 Correct data
In order to create a PAM that is representative of the wheat industry in the Western
Cape as a whole, the following was decided:
1. In calculating private prices, the structure of the COMBUD4 budgets is utilised for
the construction of specific area and system budgets, with the input of regional co-
operatives' costing and revenue data, as well as data from the COMBUD.
Questionnaires were formulated to represent a typical enterprise budget for a
typical wheat farming system. These questionnaires were sent to the relevant co-
operatives (Appendix A.3).
4 In the construction of COMBUD budgets, three data sources are used: 1. Data obtained from the
Provincial GIS and other data bases; 2. Data obtained from group discussions with farmers and other
experts; 3. Individual farmer data
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The co-operatives used in this study include:
• WPK
Head Office: Malmesbury
Telephone No. 0224822951
Fax No. 02248 21953
• PLK
(Porteville/Piketberg Co-operative)
Head Office: Piketberg
Telephone No. 022 9312134
Fax No. 0229312421
• CRK
(Caledon Riviersonderend Co-operative)
Head Office: Caledon
Telephone No. 02821 21130
Fax No. 02821 21521
• SSK
(Central-South Co-operative)
Head Office: Swellendam
Telephone No. 02851 41130
Fax No. 02851 41169
• Tuinroete
(Garden-Route)
Head Office: Mossel Bay
Telephone No. 0446011200
Fax No. 044 6951746
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• BNK
(Bredasdorp- Napier Co-operative)
Head Office: Bredasdorp
Telephone No. 02841 41120
Fax No. 02841 42111
• MBK
(Moorreesburg Farmers Co-operative)
Head Office: Moorreesburg
Telephone No. 0224332213
2. The algorithms for the calculation of private and economic prices are shown in
Appendix A.l (Calculation Means), and A.2 (Calculation Assumptions).
3. Typical farming systems are modelled, i.e. the most popular method of farming
used in a specific area. This will be either mono culture or a form of rotational
farming.
4. Two yield/ha figures are used in each case study to represent an average producer
and an efficient producer. The average producer prices are deduced from study
groups in the specific regions, and the efficient producer being the best producer,
with net income as the measure.
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5. In an effort to cover all bases, matrices were constructed in three formats:
• the first is the basic wheat system for a single year;
• the second, the basic wheat year during a rotation cycle; and
• the third, an average of the wheat system year from the past few years, to account
for the effect of the good and bad years.
6. Information for tarifflevels was obtained from Customs and Excise, Cape Town.
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6.2.2 Relevant areas
As stated in Chapter 1, there are thirteen farming areas in the two sub-regions chosen
to represent the Western Cape Wheat industry. However, only those areas where
most of the wheat is grown were included for the purposes of the calculations.
The study of Ohene-Anyang (1997) was limited to even fewer areas, mainly due to
problems incurred in the acquisition of the appropriate data. He suggested that future
studies should cover larger areas. It is evident that the following areas with their
respective wheat production systems are more representative than any of the earlier
studies, and can be considered representative of the Western Cape wheat industry:
Swartland
A) Middle Swartland:
(Moorreesburg region)
1. wheat after canola; minimum tillage
2. wheat after lupin; minimum tillage
B) Piketberg-Porterville mountains:
1. wheat after wheat; minimum tillage
2. wheat after wheat; conventional tillage
C) High rainfall Koeberg-Malmesbury area:
1. wheat after wheat
South Coast
D) Malgas! Heidelbergvlakte:
(Witsand region)
1. wheat after wheat; less tillage
2. wheat after medics; less tillage
3. wheat after lucerne; less tillage
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E) Ruens:
1. wheat after medics; conventional tillage
2. wheat after wheat; minimum tillage
F) Riversdal:
1. wheat after lucerne; less tillage
G) Slang River:
1. wheat after medics; less tillage
2. wheat after lucerne; less tillage
H) Bredasdorp:
1. wheat after wheat; minimum tillage
An enterprise budget for each regional system is provided in Appendices Bl to B 17.
Due to similarities in these budgets, an associated PAM calculation is presented only
for those systems that show a marked divergence from the average. As a result, only
eleven of the seventeen budgets are subject to a PAM analysis. For the sake of
brevity, the discussion is introduced by a detailed analysis of the budget for the
middle Swartland region, followed by a summary discussion of the other 10 matrix
results.
6.3 A PAM analysis for the Middle Swartland (Moorreesburg Region)
Information source: COMBUD; Moorreesburg Farmers Co-operative (MBK).
The enterprise budget, budget summary, and PAM calculations are shown In
Appendix B.l. The primary activity in this area is dryland wheat production after
canola with minimum tillage practices. The yield average is 2.82 tons/ha.
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DRC= 2,24 NPCO= 1,44 NPCI=1,24 EPC= 2,26 PC=-0,81 SRP= 0,44
Table 6.1 Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Moorreesburg
region, Swartland, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
Inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2538,00 1749,93 440,34 347,63
Social (shadow) prices 1763,91 1415,20 779,64 -430,93
Policy effect (divergences) 774,09 334,73 -339,30 778,56
Table 6.1 shows the results of the PAM calculations, with the twelve summary.values
that indicate the effects of market distortions. The six ratios below the table provide
further information with regard to comparative advantage and the efficiency of
resource utilisation in the wheat industry. A detailed analysis of these values is given
below.
Gross Receipts:
At the average market price for wheat in this region the private gross revenue is
R2538.00Iha. This ranks third highest amongst all the study regions (Appendix C.2),
which reflect an average private gross revenue of R2 338.11/ha (Appendix C.I).
Private gross revenue is, however, well above the social gross revenue ofRI763.91/ha
for this region. The social gross revenue is obtained by subtracting the tariff on wheat
imports from the import parity price at Cape Town harbour (Appendix A.2). The
output transfer (R774.09/ha) represents the difference between the private and social
gross revenue. The high positive level of this output transfer represents a disincentive
to producers to continue production, unless they believe that they will continue to be
protected by the tariffs.
5 As the tariff is currently well below the bound rates negotiated under the Uruguay Round, and may,
thus, even increase in the future.
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Profits:
This region is one of six to have a positive private profit (Appendix C.l). The
average private profit for all 17 regions is approximately -R6.00/ha with eleven
showing a negative profit. Therefore, the private profit is quite good and the social
loss is amongst the lowest (private = R347.63/ha; social = -R430.93/ha). The reason
56
Allocated Costs:
The average of the allocated costs of wheat production in the Western Cape is
R2 344.57/ha, compared to R2 190.37/ha (1 749.93/ha + 440.34/ha) in Moorreesburg.
The main reason for the lower cost of production in Moorreesburg is the combination
of low purchased input cost (R640.4 7/ha, Appendix C.6), machinery variable cost
(R142.52/ha, Appendix C.8), and contract hire cost (R57.00/ha, Appendix C.lI).
Private allocated cost for Moorreesburg is the sixth lowest of the study regions and
exceeds the social allocated costs by only R4.47/ha; the smallest difference of all the
regions (Appendix C.5). This difference is represented by the two divergences,
namely the tradable-input and domestic factor transfers.
The tradable-input transfer (R334.73/ha) makes the production process socially
profitable, but privately unprofitable. This situation arises because farmers are paying
more for certain inputs than they would in a free market. The most important
divergences include the import tax on herbicides (10 percent), and the tax on fuel
(43 percent). The tax on diesel has little effect on the comparative advantage of this
region but a substantial effect on the profitability of farmers over the short term. The
tradable-input transfer for Moorreesburg is one of the lowest of the various regions
and is far below the average of R409.1 O/ha (See Table 6.2 below). This indicates that
farmers have adapted to this disincentive by using fewer taxable inputs such as fuel
and herbicides.
The negative domestic factor transfer (-R339.30/ha) represents an incentive to
farmers to continue producing wheat, since negative transfers reflect the potential for
increased private profits. This figure is below the average (-R368.47/ha) for the
eleven selected regions, which is an indication that there is a small non-tradable
component of economic costs and a small difference between the social cost and the
private cost of labour for this region.
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why private profit is relatively high and social loss relatively low in Moorreesburg
stems from the combination of above average gross receipts and below average
allocated costs.
The difference between these two values (private profit and social loss) is represented
by the divergence or net policy effect (R778.56/ha). This value is above the average
net policy effect of R641.IO/ha and is the second highest of the eleven selected
regions (Table 6.2). The high net policy effect indicates the great extent to which
government policy affects this region, by increasing the cost of allocated tradable
inputs and protecting farmers through the tariff.
Ratios:
The DRC indicator is a measure of comparative advantage (Balassa & Schydlowsky,
1972). A DRC value between zero and one indicates that the opportunity cost of the
domestic resources used is less than the value added that is earned from the sale of
those resources. Comparing across activities, the one with the lowest DRC is the one
that earns the most value with the least value of inputs. Not one of the eleven regions
has a DRC value of less than unity, which means that all the regions are 'wasting'
domestic resources in wheat production.
The DRC value of 2.24 for the Moorreesburg region is below the average DRC of
2.55 for the Western Cape as a whole. In one sense, therefore, the extent of economic
\
waste is lower here than in the other regions. Table 6.3 shows that, at private prices,
this region is amongst the most efficient in the production of wheat in terms of its
ability to earn the most value with the smallest value of inputs. Nevertheless, while
the region may be said to have a comparative advantage in wheat production
compared to other parts of the Western Cape industry, it remains true that farmers
would not be able to compete with wheat imports in the absence of the tariff".
The RI80.00/ton import tariff had quite an impact on the comparative advantage of
domestic producers. When the import parity price is used as the basis for the
calculation (i.e. with the tariff in place), the DRC for this region is below unity
6 Here it is also instructive to note that, historically, the main source of wheat imports has been
Australia, where farmers receive smaller subsidies than their South African counterparts.
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DRC = 0.91. With the new tariff in place (R269/ton), the DRC value is even lower at
0.70. This indicates that producers in the Moorreesburg region have a slight
comparative advantage over imported wheat. The tariff can, therefore, be regarded as
a measure that will allow these farmers to buy time in the process of finding. ways of
reducing their costs of production.
From the NPeo value of 1.44 one can deduce that the local wheat price is 69.44
percent higher than the landed price. The landed wheat price (R625.50/ton) is lower
than the domestic wheat price by almost R300/ ton. This means that domestically
produced wheat is not competitive compared with imported wheat. The import parity
price, however, is very similar to the domestic price due to the wheat import tariff
(Appendix A.2). The import parity price at Durbanville is approximately R805.50/ton
(April, 1999), which is still below the local price, which ranges between R850 to
R950/ton depending on a number of factors".
The reason for using a conservative domestic wheat price in these calculations lies in
the difficulty faced in arriving at an exact price level. In the deregulated wheat
market in South Africa, each farmer can obtain a different contract price for his or her
wheat; at present this price generally ranges between R800 and Rl OOO/ton. Factors
that determine the price a farmer can achieve include: transport (distance from the
buyer), quality of the wheat, and prescience or good fortune. Farmers indicate
transport costs from the farm gate to the co-operative silo in their budgets, while the
transport cost from the silo to the buyer is hidden in the wheat price and difficult to
separate out (Appendix A.I).
The quality of wheat and the cultivar produced also influence the price of wheat. A
single farmer can produce different grades of different types of wheat, and obtain
varying prices for each grade and cultivar. These two factors, and the final factor of
good fortune, i.e. being in the right place at the right time, makes it difficult to set
different prices for each region, and still retain accuracy. Therefore, an average price
7 At these prices, importers are able to find a market for foreign wheat on the Western Cape market.
However, high domestic transport costs protect producers in the interior. For this reason, a 48.6 percent
increase in the import tariff on wheat (from R1811ton to R269/ton) has been implemented in an attempt
to protect Western Cape producers, albeit at a greater social cost.
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of R900/ton was chosen to represent the average price that a farmer can obtain for a
ton of wheat. This price was, however, adapted to reflect transport costs from silo to
buyer (Appendix D).
Another policy distortion that presumably affects the producer by reducing private
gross revenue is the Value Added Tax on net returns (pg. 43, Adjustments for direct
transfer payments). Vat is, however, not viewed as a policy distortion for wheat
producers as vat on inputs can be claimed back, while vat on outputs does not affect
gross revenues.
The NPCI value for Moorreesburg (1.24) is lower than the average for all producers
of wheat in the Western Cape (1.28) but is still above unity, which means that farmers
in this region pay a premium for their tradable inputs. Accounting for the tax on
diesel results in a reduction of the NPCI. Even though farmers make a profit, the
results show that their profits are still sub-normal.
Following on from the NCPO and NPCI is the EPC. The average value for
Moorreesburg (2.26) shows that private profit is far higher than it should have been,
despite the distortion in the prices of some tradable inputs. An EPC greater than unity
indicates that the profitability of an activity, given Current policy and market
conditions, exceeds the level it would have reached in a free market, i.e. if subsidies
or other distortions were removed. The EPC for the Western Cape as a whole is 2.02.
The EPC indicates that policy and market conditions for both outputs and purchased
inputs have created an incentive to undertake this activity (Janovsky, et aI1999).
The PC (-0.81) is weaker than the average of -0.26 but all the regions vary marginally
(-1.23 to 0.39). The reason behind this is that private and social profit figures differ
slightly. Accounting for the tax on diesel results in an improvement of the PC. The
last indicator, the SRP (0.44), is almost identical to the other regions, which range
between 0.36 and 0.44. This measurement of the profits derived from a financial
transfer from consumers to producers gives an indication of the favourable status quo
for producers in this region. This value of 0.44 indicates that producers receive a
premium for undertaking this activity, although it is the lowest of all the regions.
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6.4 A Summary PAM analysis for Western Cape wheat
Table 6.2 provides a summary analysis of revenues, costs and profits for the entire
Western Cape wheat industry. From the four divergences shown in the table, a
conclusive analysis can be made of the comparative advantage and competitive
position of all eleven regions included in this analysis.
Table 6.2 Summary of budgetary divergences from the PAM
REGION Output transfer Tradable-input Domestic factor Net policy effect
transfer transfer
Moorreesburg-B 1 774.09 334.73 -339.30 778.56
Moorreesburg-B3 743.89 446.82 -412.12 709.19
Piketberg-B4 669.31 362.37 -330.98 700.70
Malmesbury-Bó 785.39 449.55 -350.55 686.39
Malmesbury-B8 981.04 505.25 -467.59 932.39
Heidelberg-B9 598.07 444.02 -384.68 538.74
Heildelberg-B 10 717.69 429.97 -359.31 647.03
Ruens-Bl3 646.15 325.71 -294.01 614.45
Riversdal-B 14 509.00 • 419.09 -382.25 472.16
Slang River-Bl5 598.07 404.14 -396.20 524.93
Bredasdorp-B 17 491.18 378.47 -336.15 447.51
Average 683.08 409.10 -368.47 641.10
The average output transfer is R683.08/ha, and all the regions show a positive result.
The results vary from roughly 70% of the average to about 150%, a reflection of the
importance of transport costs in this industry. The tradable input transfer is also
positive in all cases, with a smaller variation of between 80% and 125% of the
average.
The domestic factor transfer is always negative, mainly due to the high social cost
of labour. The extent of this transfer is shown by the average of -R368.47/ha. A
major component of the domestic factors is the cost of operating capital. This cost is
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greatly affected by the high interest rates on borrowed capital (pg. 46, Capital goods).
Were interest rates to drop, capital would be more accessible to farmers and the debt
burden for farmers would be reduced.
Finally the average net policy effect of R641.1 O/ha shows that there is a disincentive
to the production of wheat in all parts of the Western Cape due to the decrease in net
returns that producer would face were there no policy distortions.
Table 6.3 shows the summarised ratios calculated from the PAM analysis for each of
the regions included in this study. Analysing the indicators by comparing one to
another is one means of determining the degree of comparative advantage of a region
compared to the rest. The DRC values range from -6.34 to 14.44. All the regions'
figures are positive, except for Heidelberg B9, Riversdal B14, and Slang River B 15
regions, which, due to irregularities in production, have social tradable input costs
greater than social gross receipts.
Table 6.3 Summary of ratio indicators from the PAM
REGION DRC NPCO NPCI EPC PC SRP
Moorreesburg-B 1 2.24 1.44 1.24 2.26 -0.81 0.44
Moorreesburg-B3 8.15 1.44 1.28 3.78 0.07 0.42
Piketberg-B4 8.49 1.43 1.24 4.85 -0.02 0.41
Malmesbury-B6 5.81 1.45 1.28 3.01 0.15 0.39
Malmesbury-B8 1.93 1.45 1.29 2.02 -1.23 0.42
Heidelberg-B9 -6.34 1.41 1.28 -0.52 0.32 0.37
Heildelberg-B I0 1.78 1.41 1.31 1.76 -1.20 0.37
Ruens-Bl3 1.75 1.41 1.28 1.84 -1.16 0.39
Riversdal-B 14 -6.30 1.41 1.31 0.15 0.39 0.38
Slang River-B 15 -3.94 1.41 1.25 -0.18 0.30 0.36
Bredasdorp-B 17 14.44 1.41 1.33 3.20 0.35 0.37
Average 2.55 1.42 1.28 2.02 -0.26 0.39
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For all the PAM's, the NPCO is similar in value, as the domestic wheat price is
similar in each case. The NPCI's are also almost identical, due to the similarities in
the production structure for wheat and the duties imposed on production inputs.
These include the IOpercent import tariff on herbicides and the tax on fuel. (Excise
duty and fuel levy = RO.80/litre). All the EPC's lie between -0.25 and 4.85, with
only Heidelberg B9 and Slang River BI5 regions having negative EPC's.
The PC's from all the calculations vary marginally (-1.23 to 0.39). The reason behind
this is that private and social profit figures differ slightly. The last indicator, the SRP,
is almost identical for each region, with a range of between 0.36 and 0.44. This
measurement of the profits derived from a financial transfer from consumers to
producers gives an indication of the favourable status quo for producers in the wheat
industry. The positive figures indicate that producers receive a premium for
undertaking this activity.
6.5 Sensitivity analysis
The values of the Domestic Resource Cost ratios, which were calculated in the
various matrices, indicate that none of the regions have a comparative advantage in
the production of wheat for the South African wheat market. However, the Policy
Analysis Matrix technique, as stated previously in Chapter Four, is a static model and
cannot capture the effects of potential changes in prices and productivity. This means
that the DRC results are subject to change as a result of changes in market conditions.
The market price per ton of wheat offered to the average farmer, either on SAFEX,
through Cape Grain, or a private sale, fluctuates throughout the year. Parity prices
also fluctuate with market and economic fluctuations, which include exchange rate
fluctuations, causing the social prices to vary.
If the wheat price should increase by the end of the season, or average yield levels
increase slightly with favourable weather conditions, for example, the DRC for all
regions would then decrease and reflect a higher comparative advantage.
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Scenario two assumes a ten per cent increase in the world price of wheat. This has
similar consequences as scenario one in that the social price, or competitive price of
imported wheat, is reflected as being. slightly higher. Although all eight regions show
improved comparative advantage, none have a DRC value below one. This means
that all regions are still comparatively weaker than imported wheat, with the
Moorreesburg region being the closest to achieving a comparative advantage (DRC
= 1.20).
In conducting a sensitivity analysis, vanous aspects should be considered. The
condition of the Western Cape wheat industry is reflected in this thesis as being very
uncompetitive. This comparative analysis study has concluded that no area has a
comparative advantage over imported wheat. Therefore the sensitivity analysis will
only focus on potential improvements in the industry's performance and their affect
on the various regions. The results for five scenarios that assume changes in these
conditions for eight of the regions are shown in Table 6.4.
These sensitivity analysis calculations have been adjusted in certain cases. For
example, if the value of the currency changes as a result of a depreciation of the Rand,
the relative prices of tradable and non-tradable inputs would change and farmers
would adjust their input mix. Therefore, the results were adjusted to accommodate the
change in production practices.
From Table 6.4 it-is apparent that all five scenarios result in positive change. DRC
figures below unity represent regions with a comparative advantage, as opposed to
figures above one, which represent unprofitable and uncompetitive farming
operations.
Scenario one assumes a devaluation of the Rand in the order of twenty five percent.
This devaluation results in an increase in the price of imports and an increased
incentive for certain industries to export. As a result, four of the eight regions show a
slight comparative advantage over imported wheat, with the Malgas-Heidelberg
region having the best DRC value (0.82). Moorreesburg also has a comparative
advantage, shown by the DRC value of 0.84.
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Table 6.4: Sensitivity analyses on DRC's for wheat production
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Ave
Basic scenario 2.24 8.49 1.93 1.78 1.75 -6.30 -3.94 14.44 5.11
Single input price
changes:
I) 25% devaluation in 0.84 1.51 0.89 0.82 0.86 3.25 3.21 2.10 1.69
the exchange rate
2) IO% increase in the 1.20 2.98 1.31 1.21 1.24 35.76 -24.26 4.30 2.97
world price
3) 20% reduction in 1.23 1.89 1.11 1.03 1.08 4.06 4.01 2.62 2.12
cost of tradables
4) 50% reduction in 0.74 0.87 0.68 0.63 0.69 1.17 1.00 1.18 0.87
cost of tradables
5) 20% increase in 0.93 1.81 1.00 0.92 0.96 4.66 5.03 2.51 2.23
producer yield levels
Multi input price
changes:
6) Combination of 0.48 0.68 0.49 0.46 0.49 1.00 0.87 0.92 0.67
scenarios I,2 &5
1- Moorreesburg Bl; 2- Piketberg-Porterville B4; 3- Koeberg-Malmesbury B8;
4- Malgas-Heildelberg BIO; 5- Ruens Bl3; 6- Riversdal BI4; 7- Slang River B15;
8- Bredasdorp B 17
Scenario three represents the results of a twenty percent reduction in the cost of
tradable inputs achieved by producers reducing tillage practices. This reduction in
cost is achievable through a change in farming practices, increased efficiency, or a
reduction in the price of certain inputs. The results show that a reduction in costs has
a slight effect in all eight regions. All show improvements but none have a
comparative advantage when compared with imported wheat. The average DRC
value is 2.12, with the highest comparative advantage being shown by the Malgas-
Heidelberg BIO region.
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Scenario four represents the results of a fifty percent reduction in the cost of tradable
inputs achieved by producers switching to minimum- and no-till production practices.
This reduction in cost is achievable through a greater change in farming practices than
in scenario three, increased efficiency, or a reduction in the price of certain inputs.
The results show that a reduction in costs has a most advantageous effect in all eight
regions. All show vast improvements in the comparative advantage measure, with
five regions below unity and the average DRC value at 0.87.
Scenario five assumes an increase in producer yield levels, which is generally only
achievable through improved farming practices such as improved cultivar selection.
The results show that even with a 20 per cent improvement in yields, only three
regions show some comparative advantage over imported wheat. The average DRC
for the Western Cape remains above unity (DRC = 2.51), showing that the region
cannot rely on an increased yield to build comparative advantage.
Scenario six represents an amalgam of three of the above scenanos. Here it is
assumed that the exchange rate depreciates and the world price and yields increase.
Obviously, the effect on DRC is greater than in the case of the separate scenarios. All
regions in the Western Cape now have a comparative advantage in wheat production,
with the sole exception of the Riversdal region, which has a DRC value of 1.00.
6.6 Conclusion
Private profits are greater than social profits in the Western Cape wheat industry.
Although deregulation has occurred in the wheat sector, the government still
influences the wheat price by imposing import tariffs on certain chemical inputs, by
taxing fuel, and by levying a tariff on imported wheat. The aggregated result of these
interventions is that the profit that farmers would have made in a free market are
lower than those they are actually making today (measured as a positive net policy
effect in terms of the PAM). Thus, in a strict interpretation of these results, farmers
should at least consider suspending the production of wheat in the Western Cape.
However, the results show that the region will have a comparative advantage in wheat
production if:
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• The tariff is kept in place;
• The exchange rate depreciates;
• Farmers succeed in lowering their cost of production.
These scenarios are based on reality. First, as the existing tariff is below the bound
rates of the Uruguay Round, the scope for an increase exists, and the government has
already implemented such an increase. Second, there is a consensus in the market
regarding a depreciation of the exchange rate. Third, there is anecdotal evidence that
wheat farmers in the Western Cape have targeted production costs as the most
important variable in improving the profitability of production. This includes finding
ways of decreasing their use of individual inputs as well as changes to the mode of
production. Finally, the results show that increased yields are insufficient to ensure
the long-term survival of the industry.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
The purpose in this study was to investigate whether any comparative advantages
exist in the commercial production of wheat in the Western Cape, using the Policy
Analysis Matrix as the key analytical tool. To this end, representative data that reflect
the conditions in the industry as closely as possible had to be gathered. These data
were then used to construct the matrix, and a series of sensitivity analyses were
conducted to establish the robustness of the results. The findings of the research are
summarised in this Chapter. On this basis, a number of proposals for future policy
and investigation are made.
7.2 Summary
7.2.1 Agricultural policy
The distortions created by South African agricultural policy and the wider social and
economic effects have been widely analysed and documented. However, much of the
attention has been focused on the period prior to the final deregulation of the
agricultural marketing system in 1996, whereas numerous distortions still remain
today. Thus, although deregulation has occurred, many farmers are unaware of the
continued effect that Government still has on the agricultural sector.
In this study it was found that the Government protects the sector mainly through the
imposition of a tariff on imported wheat, and tax farmers through tariffs and taxes on
certain key inputs, the most important being the 10percent import tariff on herbicides
and the diesel fuel tax. This prevents certain farmers from increasing efficiency, due
to the higher cost of particular inputs. The main purpose of this research was to
ascertain whether the net effect of these interventions on farmers, and on society as a
whole, is positive or negative.
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• The average NPCI value of 1.28 indicates that producers pay a premium for
their tradable inputs. The two inputs that have the most influence on the NPCI are
the cost of fuel (diesel) and the purchased input cost of chemicals. While the tax
on diesel has little effect on the long run comparative advantage of Western Cape
commercial farmers, as they have proven able to adapt by becoming more fuel-
efficient (Appendix A.I), it does have a substantial effect on the profitability of
farmers over the short term.
7.2.2 Results
The main conclusion drawn from this analysis of the wide range of wheat farming
practices and farming systems in the Western Cape, is that Western Cape w~eat
farmers do not at present have a comparative advantage in wheat production. The
following conclusions can be drawn from the results of the PAM analysis, based on an
average for the regions investigated:
• The average DRC value of 2.55 (Table 6.2) shows that the Western Cape does
not have a comparative advantage in the production of wheat. This figure indicates
that the opportunity cost of the domestic resources used, is higher than the value
added that is earned from the sale of those resources. In other words, the resources
available to farmers are not being utilised to their optimum in wheat production.
• The average NPCO value of 1.42 indicates that wheat producers in the Western
Cape are receiving a price premium that represents a financial transfer from
consumers of wheat products to the producers. The transfer occurs mainly because
of the ruling import tariff of R 1811ton on wheat. The tariff protects Western Cape
wheat farmers against competition from imported wheat. The analysis also shows
that this tariff will probably remain in place for some time, and that it may even be
increased over the short term", However, farmers should use the breathing space
provided to promote efficiency in production, as there is no guarantee that it will
remain in place indefinitely.
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• The PC and SRP, with values of -0.26 and 0.39 respectively, reinforce the
notion that policy assists farmers, who currently enjoy a comparative advantage
due to the imposition of the tariff. The PC ratio measures the extent to which
policy conditions have created an incentive to undertake the activity of wheat
farming in the Western Cape (the negative value shows a disincentive). The SRP
is a measure of the profits derived from a financial transfer from the consumers to
the producers (the value reflects the positive net policy effect that is common in all
the budgets).
• The EPC value of 2.02 indicates that the profitability of wheat farming in the
Western Cape, given the current policy and market conditions, does not exceed
what it would be if all distortions were removed. The conclusion is thus that the
implicit tax that farmers pay on more expensive inputs is smaller than the. implicit
subsidy they receive as a result of the tariff.
Although these ratios deliver a conclusive picture of the wheat industry, the PAM is a
static model and cannot capture the potential changes in prices and productivity.
Therefore, the DRC values of the various regions are subject to change as a result of
changes in market conditions. The sensitivity analysis is therefore necessary to
determine the robustness of the DRC's against price and yield changes.
The sensitivity analysis shows that a weaker exchange rate would lead to an increase
in comparative advantage for all regions. According to Troskie and Wallace (1996)
though, the effect would lead to a decrease in the area with high profitability over the
medium term, and over the long term, secondary and tertiary effects would lead to a
return to the status quo. A devaluation of the Rand would therefore not ensure the
long-term competitiveness of the industry, but will provide a welcome breather for
producers to make structural changes to their operations.
The sensitivity analysis also shows that an increase in the world price of wheat has
similar consequences as the above scenario. A slight reduction in the cost of tradable
inputs, achieved by producers reducing tillage practices, has little effect though.
8 As of the 11tit of June, 1999 the import tariff on wheat increased from the R1811ton to R269/ton
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Through a greater change in farming practices a large reduction in cost is achievable,
and this results in vast improvements in the comparative advantage measure. An
improvement of co-ordination of activities and increased management proficiency can
achieve reduced machinery hours and result in lower variable costs. Research has
shown that in the past farmers have been successful at doing so. Reducing variable
costs, such as fuel, can have a substantial effect on the profitability of farmers over the
short term (Vink & Kirsten, 2000). This will also reduce the number of man-hours.
The labour cost is extraordinarily high for a region with the possibility of contracting.
Finally, the sensitivity analysis shows that regions cannot rely on an increased yield to
build comparative advantage. Yield increases on current production are difficult to
achieve without concomitant cost increases, and therefore irrelevant as a measure to
increase comparative advantage.
7.3 General conclusions and policy proposals
According to Tweeten and Zulauf, the new paradigm for agriculture for any country
should focus on public policy for agriculture, emphasising market efficiency through
four general concepts:
• The removal of market barriers,
• The provision of public goods and policies aimed at the internalisation of
externalities,
• The promotion of economic equity with a safety net, and
• Food security through the private sector.
The opportunity lies in what might be called "the commercialisation of commercial
agriculture". Without subsidies and the distortions that result from interventionist
policies, farmers are more likely to respond normally to market-determined price
signals, and to behave in ways more consistent with economic rationality. Thus, a
new research environment is emerging, one in which existing theory and methods can
(SAGIS, 1999)
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be more thoroughly applied, stronger conclusions drawn, and aggregate economic
behaviour better predicted. In this environment, the level of quantitative analysis can
be increased significantly, and be given the mandate for better policy support in a time
of rapid adjustment and change (WCAGRSAM, 1997).
South African farmers have faced high nominal interest rates in recent times, creating
cash flow problems. Furthermore, real interest rates have recently seen record high
levels in South Africa, and this has a major depressing effect on land prices and the
collateral of farmers. The high real interest rates have kept the Rand exchange rate
artificially high, acting as a tax on exports and a subsidy on imports, while major
agricultural producing countries such as the USA and Western Europe experience low
interest rates and near zero inflation rates. The depressed economic situation in South
Africa has also had a major negative effect on the demand for food.
Nieuwoudt (1999) explains that food demand, especially for livestock and other high
value products, can 'explode' with higher income growth due to high-income
elasticities of demand. As income per capita growth has been negative in recent years
in South Africa, but one can expect that food demand will increase slowly, and is
limited to the growth in population.
On the other hand, Rwelamira & Kleynhans (1998) show that, given South Africa's
dominance in industrial development and relatively limited agricultural resource base,
one can expect that opportunities for agricultural production in other SADC countries
will open up over the longer term. However, this will require strong research and
extension support and considerable investment in human skills and physical and social
infrastructure. With this phenomenon will come increased competition for South
African producers, which includes wheat farmers.
The competitive advantage for the Western Cape, or for that matter the South African
wheat industry, depends on the industry's ability to sustain continued increases in
productivity throughout the supply chain. Thus, success ultimately depends on a
positive synergy between the following five variables:
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• Factor conditions
• Demand conditions
• Related and support industries
• Role that government plays
• Individual firm strategy
There are a number of factors that militate against success in the Western Cape
context. The province's wheat farmers are not protected by high transport costs to
interior markets as are, for example, farmers in the Free State, and farmers face
relatively low, albeit stable rainfall (the average annual rainfall for the Western Cape,
at around 450 mm per annum, is lower than the South African average of 497 mm).
To put these figures in perspective, a comparison could be made with the world
average, which stands at 860 mm (Agrimark Tendense, 1999). Nevertheless, farmers
have already shown themselves capable of adapting to the changed circumstances,
and could build competitive advantage if they pursued appropriate strategies.
In the South African wheat industry, the challenge lies in meeting the need for more
and better analysis to support, direct and ease the major adjustments now underway.
In this changing environment, it is essential that policy makers, producers, consumers
and the market be better informed of the issues before them, and of the consequences
of alternative policy decisions. This is nowhere more important than in the Western
Cape province, where agriculture is extremely diverse and remains a strong source of
economic growth, export earnings, jobs and incomes for the poor (Eckert & Viljoen,
1995).
Various bodies and institutions are underway in establishing this strengthened wheat
industry. Research and development are prime aims of such institutions. These
include SAGIS9, Cape Grain, SENSAKO, the ARC (Grains Crop Institute),
Department of Agriculture at Elsenburg, and many of the Western Cape Co-
operatives and farmers' organisations.
9 The main objective of SAGIS is to obtain and process domestic grain information and to make
available macro-economic information locally and internationally to enable role players in the grain
industry (commercial and emerging sectors) to continue making meaningful decisions.
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A step in searching for creative solutions though, will be to raise awareness among
producers, input suppliers, service organisations and processors of their mutual
interdependence (Street et al, 1998). This will have to be supplemented by. a target
costing approach (Appendix F) by Western Cape wheat producers in order to increase
their national and international competitiveness. This involves reversed engineering
procedures, which is suggested as a means of ensuring that Western Cape wheat
farmers can survive in the market place.
Considering all the fore-mentioned arguments and statements, the future of the
Western Cape wheat industry ultimately lies in the ability of supporting organisations
to assist the wheat farmer in a combined effort to establish a stable and competitive
environment.
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Appendix A.1:
Calculation means
1) Depreciation cost! annum:
Equal to the purchase price minus the salvage value; divide by assets lifetime
(yrs.)
2) Salvage value:
Equal to 10% of the purchase price
3) Inflation Rates:
The current rate of inflation in South Africa is 1.9 percent. At the level of
production prices, inflation over one year accelerated from 2,3 per cent in March
1998 to 6,4 per cent in June 1999 and 6,2 per cent in July. The prices of imported
goods, which had declined by 2,3 per cent in the year to February 1998, rose by
10,3 per cent in the year to June 1999 and 7,0 per cent in the year to July,
contributing to the accumulation of inflationary pressures. The rise in the prices
of imported goods, in turn, was strongly affected by an increase of almost 40 per
cent in the price of imported crude oil from the first quarter of 1999 to the second
quarter (SARB, 1999).
4) Land Rental Value:
There are various methods for the calculation of land rental values. The two used
in this study are:
* 4 -7 % of the real value of the land (Nieuwoudt, W., 1980)
* Farmers' personal valuations
5) Social cost of labour
Calculation is very subjective. Central Statistics has country-wide averages as of
December 1997:
Average Wage Rate per annum
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Manufacturing sector
Construction
- blacks (R 27 684)
- coloureds (R33 000)
- blacks (R 18 816)
- coloureds (R 30 180)
- blacks (R23 892)
- coloureds (R29 352)
WholesalelRetail
Private research in the Boland has shown that the average semi-skilled farm
labourer would otherwise be working in a similar position as a restaurant kitchen!
scullery staff; service station employee or a similar paying position.
Figures as of May 1999:
Average Wage Rate per annum
Service Industry - black/coloured @ R7.501hr maximum
= R 14 400 per annum
Therefore, from these figures comes an average figure for each region according
to the average alternate employment opportunity specific to each region. The size
of the labour group is calculated using the average of 6 employees per 500ha for a
farm that only uses permanent labour and minimal contracting (WPK-
Malmesbury).
6) Social cost of chemicals: Customs and Excise (May 24, J 999)
Insecticides and Fungicides - no tariff
Herbicides - 10% tariff
7) Fertiliser: - no tariff
8) The social cost of fuel:
Diesel price R2.l4/1 (May 25,1999)
Excise duty (R 0.03817/1)
+ Fuel levy (R 0.76/1)
= RO.80/1 duty on diesel
Social price: R2.l4 - RO.80 = R1.34/1
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The effect of taxation on diesel (December, 1999)
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This exhibit illustrates the composition of the price of diesel during December
1999. This shows that the distortion in the price is close to 43%, while the
distortion caused by the fuel tax is 33%. The tax on diesel is justified by
considerations such as the intermodal transport equity and environmental
considerations (Vink & Kirsten, 2000).
9) Machinery: No tariff on tractors and harvesters
10) In the absence of data from the co-operatives, the non-tradable portion of
economic prices are calculated as follows (percentage of private price):
Purchased inputs - 20%
Machinery costs - 10%
Implement costs - 10%
Contractlhire service - 35%
Crop insurance - 5%
11) Transport Cost
1- Farm gate to Silo
The transport cost of wheat from the farm gate to the silo is, for the most part,
incorporated into the enterprise budgets. In cases where the cost is not
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incorporated, the cost of transport is calculated using the assumption of putting
transport cost into three categories for farmers of varying distance from the silo
(WPK, 1999):
radius smaller than 15km : R6.92 per ton
radius between 15 and 30km: R17.31 per ton
radius greater than 30km : R34.62 per ton
2- Silo to final destination
This cost is calculated from averages around the Western Cape, obtained from
various Co-operatives and organisations such as Cape Grain. Exact costs could
not be obtained due to various transport companies not disclosing information for
matters of competitiveness (Appendix D).
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Appendix A.2:
Calculation Assumptions
1) All figures are calculated in a manner to reflect recent trends in the wheat
industry. All cost data is calculated or adjusted to be as near to 30th April, 1999 as
possible. Other data, such as tariff levels and wheat prices are also taken as of 30th
April, 1999. The reasoning behind this is that the input prices have stayed
reasonably constant for the latter end of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999.
2) Tariff level:
Prior to June 1999 the tarifflevel was RI81.00/ ton (25% ad valorem) (Customs
and Excise, 1999). A 48.6 percent (R88/ ton) increase has resulted in a tariff level
ofR269.00/ ton as of 11th June 1999 (37% ad valorem), (SAGIS, 1999; Hom,
1999).
3) World Wheat price (US no.2 HRW fob Gulf) -(SAGA, 1999)
$ 112.67 =R 694.39 ($I:R6.163- 31st July, 1999)
$ 104.24 =R625.50 ($1:R6.00 - 1999 average)
4) Domestic Wheat price
As of May 31, 1999, the SAFEX wheat price for highest quality wheat (BPS)
stood at Rl 192-00 per ton (Randfontein). Although the 1999 Wheat price has
been fluctuating between R930/t and R950/t for average quality wheat, R 900.00/t
is a stable, conservative representative figure (SAGA). Variations are made in
order to reflect the transport variable from the silo to the buyer.
5) Import Parity price:
Delivered price HRW (Randfontein)- R 986.47
Delivered price DNS (Randfontein) - R 1174.82
(These prices form the basis for calculating economic/ social revenue price: The
Hard red winter price is used instead of the Dark northern spring, due to the
relative imported quantity levels.)
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Delivered price HRW (Durbanville)- R806.50
The first two parity prices are for Randfontein. This can be compared to the
Normal wheat contract which differs from the Cape wheat contract (Durbanville)
by the transport cost of approximately RI80. However, if imported wheat arrived
in the Cape Town harbour, it is presumed that the Randfontein and Durbanville
prices would differ by the transport cost.
6) Social price of wheat:
The social price for wheat is the landing price at Cape Town harbour. This price
is the delivered price at Durbanville (R806.50) minus the import tariff (RI81), i.e.
R625.50. The reason for deducting the import tariff is due to this being a form of
government regulation.
7) A final assumption is that if the social price of an input cost is, for some reason,
incalculable, the social price will be the same as the private price in an effort to
retain the budget's accuracy .
•
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Appendix A.3: Example of Questionnaire sent to Co-operatives
ENTERPRISE BUDGET FOR WHEAT PRODUCTION IN _
AREA
Date:-------
GROSS INCOME
Product income:
-Grain
-Silage and hay
ALLOCATED COSTS
Purchased inputs:
-Wheat seed
-Lime
-Fertilizer
-Crop chemicals
Machinery fixed costs:
-Depreciation
-Interest
Machinery variable costs:
-Fuel
-Repairs/Maintenance
-Tyres
Implements fixed costs:
-Depreciation
-Interest
Implements variable costs:
-Repairs
Contract hire service:
-Air spray
-Bird spray
-Harvesting
-Bailing twine
-Transport
Other:
-Crop insurance
-Labour cost
-Interest on operating capital
-Cost of land
Sub-total
89
Totallba Total/ton
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Appendix B.1: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the
Moorreesburg region, wheat after canola- minimum tillage; 1997/98
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,82t*900) (2,82t*625,5)
2538,00 1763,91 1763,91
ALLOCATED COSTS 2190,37 2194,84
Purchased inputs: 640,47 618,47 123,69 494,78
Wheat seed 163,90 163,90 32,78 131,12
Lime 8,40 8,40 1,68 6,72
Fertiliser 257,15 257,15 51,43 205,72
Crop Chemicals 211,02 189,92 37,98 151,94
Machinery fixed costs: 397,09 397,09 39,71 357,38
Depreciation 244,43 244,43 24,44 219,99
Interest 152,66 152,66 15,27 137,39
Machinery variable costs: 142,52 121,37 37,17 84,20
Fuel 56,58 35,43 7,09 28,34
Repairs/ maintenance 85,94 85,94 30,08 55,86
Implements fixed costs: 394,91 394,91 39,49 355,42
Depreciation 206,19 206,19 20,62 185,57
Interest 188,72 188,72 18,87 169,85
Implements variable costs: 85,57 85,57 29,95 55,62
Contract hire service: 57,00 57,00 19,95 37,05
Spraying 42,00 42,00
Sowing 15,00 15,00
Other: 472,71 520,43
Crop insurance 32,37 32,37 1,62 30,75
Labour 117,42 165,14
Interest on operating capital 218,33 218,33
Land 104,59 104,59
NET RETURN 347,63 -430,93
90
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Budget summary: Wheat production in the Moorreesburg region, Swartland,
1997/98 (R/ha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2538,00 1763,91
Allocated costs 2190,37 2194,84
Tradables: 1749,93 1415,20
Purchased inputs 640,47 494,78
Machinery costs 539,61 441,58
Implement costs 480,48 411,04
Contractlhire service 57,00 37,05
Crop insurance 32,37 30,75
Domestic factors: 440,34 779,64
Cost of land 104,59 104,59
Labour costs 117,42 165,14
Cost of operating capital 218,33 218,33
Components of tradables 291,58
Net Returns 347,63 -430,93
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Appendix B.2: Enterprise budget (R/ha) for wheat production in the
Moorreesburg region, wheat after medics-conventional tillage; 1997/98
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,8t*900) (2,8t*625,5)
2520,00 1751,40 1751,40
ALLOCATED COSTS 2243,68 2249,11
Purchased inputs: 642,78 621,68 124,34 467,34
Wheat seed 163,90 163,90 32,74 131,12
Lime 13,86 13,86 2,77 11,09
Fertiliser 254,00 254,00 50,80 203,20
Crop Chemicals 211,02 189.92 37,98 151,94
Machinery fixed costs: 397,09 397,09 39,71 357,38
Depreciation 244,43 244,43 24,44 219,99
Interest 152,66 152,66 15,27 137,39
Machinery variable costs: 142,52 121,43 37,18 84,25
Fuel 56,58 35,49 7,10 28,39
Repairs/ maintenance 85,94 85,94 30,08 55,86
Implements fixed costs: 394,91 394,91 39,49 355,42
Depreciation 206,19 206,19 20,62 185,57
Interest 188,72 188,72 18,87 169,85
Implements variable costs: 85,57 85,57 29,95 55,62
Contract hire service: 108,00 108,00 37,80 70,20
Spraying 35,00 35,00
Sowing 15,00 15,00
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Other: 472,71 520,43
Crop insurance 32,37 32,37 1,62 30,75
Labour 117,42 165,14
Interest on operating capital 218,33 218,33
Land 104,59 104,59
NET RETURN 276,32 -497,71
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Appendix B.3: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for a wheat production system in the
Moorreesburg region, Swartland. Wheat after wheat- minimum tillage; 1997/98
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,71 t*900) (2,71t*625,5)
2439,00 1695,11 1695,11
ALLOCATED COSTS 2494,18 2459,38
Purchased inputs: 595,00 579,78 115,95 463,83
Wheat seed 206,02 206,02 41,20 164,82
Fertiliser 236,75 236,75 47,35 189,40
Crop Chemicals 152,23 137,01 27,40 109,61
Machinery fixed costs: 397,09 397,09 39,71 357,38
Depreciation 244,43 244,43 24,44 219,99
Interest - 152,66 152,66 15,27 137,39
Machinery variable costs: 238,28 189,77 54,23 135,54
Fuel 129,76 81,25 16,25 65,00
Repairs/ maintenance 108,52 108,52 37,98 70,54
Implements fixed costs: 394,91 394,91 39,49 355,42
Depreciation 206,19 206,19 20,62 185,57
Interest 188,72 188,72 18,87 169,85
Implements variable costs: 85,57 85,57 29,95 55,62
Contract hire service: 291,83 291,83 102,14 189,69
Marketing 197, Il 197, Il
Transport 41,45 41,45
Diverse 53,27 53,27
Other: 491,40 520,43
Crop insurance 32,37 32,37 1,62 30,75
Labour 136,1l 165,14
Interest on operating capital 218,33 218,33
Land 104,59 104,59
NET RETURN -55,18 -764,27
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Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Moorreesburg region,
Swartland, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Moorreesburg reigon, Swartland,
1997/98 (R/ha)
PRIV ATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2439,00 1695,11
Allocated costs 2494,08 2459,38
Tradables: 2035,05 1588,23
Purchased inputs 595,00 463,83
Machinery costs 635,37 492,92
Implement costs 480,48 411,04
Contractlhire service 291,83 189,69
Crop insurance 32,37 30,75
Domestic factors: 459,03 871,15
Cost of land 104,59 104,59
Labour costs 136,11 165,14
Cost of operating capital 218,33 218,33
Components of tradables 383,09
Net Returns -55,08 -764,27
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2439,00 2035,05 459,03 -55,08
Social (shadow) prices 1695,11 1588,23 871,15 -764,27
Policy effect (divergences) 743,89 446,82 -412,12 709,19
DRC =8,15 NPCO =1,44 NPCI=I,28 EPC =3,78 PC =0,07 SRP=0,42
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Appendix B.4: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the Piketberg-
Porterville region, Swartland. Wheat after wheat- minimum tillage; 1997/98
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,6t * 895) (2,6t * 625,5)
2327,00 1626,30 1626,30
ALLOCATED COSTS 2315,67 2284,28
Purchased inputs: 798,56 774,66 154,93 619,73
Wheat seed 178,80 178,80 35,76 143,04
Lime 16,80 16,80 3,36 13,44
Fertiliser 363,92 363,92 72,78 291,14
Crop Chemicals 239,04 215,14 43,03 172,11
Machinery fixed costs: 409,43 409,43 40,94 368,49
Depreciation 253,85 253,85 25,39 228,47
Interest 155,58 155,58 15,56 140,02
Machinery variable costs: 146,95 125,49 38,53 86,96
Fuel 57,41 35,95 7,19 28,76
Repairs/ maintenance 89,54 89,54 31,34 58,20
Implements fixed costs: 394,91 394,91 39,49 355,42
Depreciation 206,19 206,19 20,62 185,57
Interest 188,72 188,72 18,87 169,85
Implements variable costs: 85,57 85,57 29,95 55,62
Contract hire service: 33,00 33,00 11,55 21,45
Sowing 15,00 15,00
Transport 18,00 18,00
Other: 447,25 461,22
Crop insurance 32,37 32,37 1,62 30,75
Labour 46,55 60,52
Interest on operating capital 218,33 218,33
Land 150,000 150,00
NET RETURN 11,33 -657,98
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Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Piketberg-Porterville region,
Swartland, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Piketberg-Porterville region,
Swartland, 1997/98 (Rlha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2327,00 1626,30
Allocated costs 2315,67 2284,28
Tradables: , 1900,79 1538,42
Purchased inputs 788,56 619,73
Machinery costs 556,38 455,45
Implement costs 480,48 411,04
Contract/hire service 33,00 21,45
Crop insurance 32,37 30,75
Domestic factors: 414,88 745,86
Cost of land 150,00 150,00
Labour costs 46,55 60,52
Cost of operating capital 218,33 218,33
Components of tradables 317,01
Net return 11,33 -657,98
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2327,00 1900,79 414,8~ 11,33
Social (shadow) prices 1626,30 1538,42 745,86 -657,98
Policy effect (divergences) 700,70 362,37 -330,98 669,31
DCR =8,49 NPCO =1,43 NPCI=I,24 EPC =4,85 PC =-0,02 SRP=0,41
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Appendix B.5: Enterprise budget (R/ha) for wheat production in the Piketberg-
Porterville region, Swartland. Wheat after wheat- conventional tillage; 1997/98
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,8t * 895) (2,8t * 625,5)
2506,00 1751,40 1751,40
ALLOCATED COSTS 2801,17 2718,03
Purchased inputs: 827,37 800,36 160,07 640,29
Wheat seed 186,25 186,25 37,25 149,00
Fertiliser 371,00 371,00 74,20 296,80
Crop Chemicals 270,12 243,11 48,62 194,49
Machinery fixed costs: 527,64 527,64 52,76 474,88
Depreciation 326,93 326,93 32,69 294,24
Interest 200,71 200,71 20,07 180,64
Machinery variable costs: 485,43 415,33 127,75 287,58
Fuel 187,52 117,42 23,48 93,94
Repairs/ maintenance 297,91 297,91 104,27 193,64
Implements fixed costs: 394,91 394,91 39,49 355,42
Depreciation 206,19 206,19 20,62 185,57
Interest 188,72 188,72 18,87 169,85
Implements variable costs: 85,57 85,57 29,95 55,62
Contract hire service: 33,00 33,00 11,55 21,45
Spraying 15,00 15,00
Transport 18,00 18,00
Other: 447,25 461,22
Crop insurance 32,37 32,37 1,62 30,75
Labour 46,55 60,52
Interest on operating capital 218,33 218,33
Land 150,00 150,00
NET RETURN -295,17 -966,63
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Appendix B.6: Enterprise budget (Rfha) for wheat production in the
Malmesbury region, Swartland. Wheat after wheat system; 1990-98 average.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,81 t * 905) (2,8lt* 625,5)
2543,05 1757,66 1757,66
ALLOCATED COSTS 2659,95 2560,95
Purchased inputs: 1000,12 999,16 199,83 799,33
Wheatseed 181,17 181,17 36,23 144,94
Lime 27,20 27,20 5,44 21,76
Fertiliser 529,20 529,20 105,84 423,36
Crop Chemicals 290,66 261,59 52,32 209,27
Machinery fixed costs: 432,25 432,25 43,23 389,03
Depreciation 288,57 288,57 28,86 259,71
Interest 143,68 143,68 14,37 129,31
Machinery variable costs: 354,97 296,93 89,35 207,58
Fuel 155,23 97,20 19,44 77,76
Repairs/ maintenance 199,73 199,73 69,91 129,82
Implements fixed costs: 88,02 88,02 8,80 79,22
Depreciation 54,54 54,54 5,45 49,09
Interest 33,48 33,48 3,35 30,13
Implements variable costs: 56,77 56,77 19,87 36,90
Contract hire service: 80,19 80,19 28,07 52,12
Spraying 70,75 70,75
Harvesting 9,49 9,49
Other: 647,63 607,63
Crop insurance 27,97 27,97 1,40 26,57
Labour 220,00 180,00
Interest on operating capital 131,78 131,78
Land 150,00 150,00
Diverse 117,88 117,88
NET RETURN -116,90 -803,29
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DRC= 5,81 NPCO= 1,45 NPCI=1,28 EPC= 3,01 PC= 0,15 SRP= 0,39
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Koeberg-Malmesbury region,
Swartland, 1990-98 average (R/ha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2543,05 1757,66
Allocated costs 2659,95 2560,95
Tradables: 2040,29 1590,74
Purchased inputs 1000,12 799,33
Machinery costs 787,22 596,60
Implement costs 144,79 116,12
Contract/hire service 80,19 52,12
Crop insurance 27,97 26,57
Domestic factors: 619,66 970,21
Cost of land .- 150,00 150,00
Labour costs 220,00 180,00
Cost of operating capital 131,78 131,78
Components of tradables 390,55
Diverse 117,88 117,88
Net Return -116,90 -803,29
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Koeberg-Malmesbury region,
Swartland, 1990-98 average (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2543,05 2040,29 619,66 -116,90
Social (shadow) prices 1757,66 1590,74 970,21 -803,29
Policy effect (divergences) 785,39 449,55 -350,55 686,39
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Appendix B.7: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the Koeberg-
Malmesbury region, wheat after wheat system; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,8t * 905) (2,8t * 625,5)
2534,00 1751,40 1751,40
ALLOCATED COSTS 2822,92 2656,81
Purchased inputs: 1036,98 959,54 191,91 767,63
Wheat seed 151,65 151,65 30,33 121,32
Lime 17,19 17,19 3,44 13,75
Fertiliser 520,26 520,26 104, 05 416,21
Crop Chemicals 300,49 270,44 54,09 216,35
Machinery fixed costs: 465,73 465,73 46,57 419,16
Depreciation 288,57 288,57 28,86 259,71
Interest 177,16 177,16 17,72 159,44
Machinery variable costs: 556,00 479,28 148,42 330,76
Fuel 205,46 128,64 25,73 102,91
Repairs/ maintenance 350,54 350,54 122,69 227,85
Implements fixed costs: 88,02 88,02 8,80 79,22
Depreciation 54,54 54,54 5,45 49,09
Interest 34,38 34,38 3,35 30,13
Implements variable costs: 91,64 91,64 32,07 59,57
Contract hire service: 71,26 71,26 24,94 46,32
Fertilising and spraying 66,29 66,29
Machinery 4,97 4,97
Other: 513,29 501,34
Crop insurance 27,52 27,52 1,40 26,57
Labour 196,60 184,65
Interest on operating capital 131,78 131,78
Land 150,00 150,00
Sundries 7,39 7,39
NET RETURN -288,92 -905,41
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Appendix B.8: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the
Malmesbury region, Swartland. Wheat after wheat- 1997/98 best producer.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (3,51 t *905) (3,51t *625,5)
3176,55 2195,51 2195,51
ALLOCATED COSTS 2662,96 2614,30
Purchased inputs: 1181,13 1165,03 233,01 932,02
Wheat seed 173,87 173,87 34,77 139,10
Lime 85,94 85,94 17,19 68,75
Fertiliser 709,25 709,25 141,85 567,40
Chemicals 161,01 144,91 28,98 115,93
Diverse 51,06 51,06 10,21 40,85
Machinery fixed costs: 465,73 465,73 46,57 419,16
Depreciation 288,57 288,57 28,86 259,71
Interest 177,16 177,16 17,72 159,44
Machinery variable costs: 362,90 289,16 82,68 206,48
Fuel 197,25 123,51 24,70 98,81
Repairs/ maintenance 165,65 165,65 57,98 107,67
Implements fixed costs: 88,02 88,02 8,80 79,22
Depreciation 54,54 54,54 5,45 49,09
Interest 34,38 34,38 3,35 30,13
Implements variable costs: 21,63 21,63 7,57 14,06
Contract hire service: 103,38 103,38 36,18 67,20
Other: 420,17 481,35
Crop insurance 12,05 12,05 0,60 11,45
Labour 111,66 172,84
Interest on operating capital 161,85 161,85
Land hire 150,00 150,00
General 4,61 4,61
NET RETURN 513,59 -418,80
101
DRC= 1,93 NPCO= 1,45 NPCI=I,29 EPC= 2,02 PC=-1,23 SRP= 0,42
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Koeberg-Malmesbury region,
Swartland. 1998 best (Rlha)
PRIV ATE PRICES ECONOMIC PlllCES
Gross receipts 3176,55 2195,51
Allocated costs 2662,96 2614,30
Tradables: 2234,84 1729,59
Purchased inputs 1181,13 932,02
Machinery costs 828,63 625,64
Implement costs 109,65 93,28
Contract/hire service 103,38 67,20
Crop insurance 12,05 11,45
Domestic factors: 423,51 900,10
Cost of land 150,00 150,00
Labour costs 111,66 172,84
Cost of operating capital 161,85 161,85
Components of tradables . 415,41
Net Return 513,59 -418,80
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Koeberg-Malmesbury region,
Swartland. 1998 best (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 3176,55 2234,84 423,51 513,59
Social (shadow) prices 2195,51 1729,59 900,10 -418,80
Policy effect (divergences) 981,04 505,25 -476,59 932,39
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Appendix B.9: Enterprise budget {Rlha} for wheat production in the Heildelberg
region, South Coast. Wheat after wheat- less tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,35t * 880) (2,35t *625,5)
2068,00 1469,93 1469,93
ALLOCATED COSTS 2317,44 2258,10
Purchased inputs: 901,56 867,05 173,41 693,64
Wheat seed 184,80 184,80 36,96 147,84
Fertiliser 371,61 371,61 74,32 297,29
Crop Chemicals 345,15 310,64 62,13 248,51
Machinery fixed costs: 389,02 389,02 38,90 350,12
Depreciation 259,71 259,71 25,97 233,74
Interest 129,31 129,31 12,93 116,38
Machinery variable costs: 217,24 184,68 56,46 128,22
Fuel 87,11 54,55 10,91 43,64
Repairs/ maintenance 130,13 130,13 45,55 84,58
Implements fixed costs: 241,47 241,47 24,15 217,32
Depreciation 130,37 130,37 13,04 117,33
Interest 111,10 111,10 11,11 99,99
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 187,50 187,50 65,63 121,87
Spraying 42,00 42,00
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Transport 87,50 87,50
Other: 332,36 340,09
Crop insurance 30,00 30,00 1,50 28,50
Labour 25,77 33,50
Interest on operating capital 91,59 91,59
Land 140,00 140,00
Diverse (admin) 45,00 45,00
NET RETURN -249,44 -788,18
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DRC=-6,34 NPCO= 1,41 NPCI=1,28 EPC=-0,52 PC= 0,32 SRP= 0,37
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Malgas-Heildelbergvlakte region,
South Coast, 1997/98 (Rlha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2068,00 1469,93
Allocated costs 2317,44 2258,10
Tradables: 2015,08 1571,06
Purchased inputs 901,56
- 693,64
Machinery costs 606,26 478,34
Implement costs 289,76 248,71
Contract/hire service 187,50 121,87
Crop insurance 30,00 28,50
Domestic factors: 257,36 642,04
Cost ofland 140,00 140,00
Labour costs 25,77 33,50
Cost of operating capital 91,59 91,59
Components of tradables 376,95
Net Return -249,44 -788,18
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Malgas-Heildelbergvlakte
region, South Coast, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2068,00 2015,08 257,36 -249,44
Social (shadow) prices 1469,93 1571,06 642,04 -788,18
Policy effect (divergences) 598,07 444,02 -384,68 538,74
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Appendix B.I0: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the
Heildelberg region, South Coast. Wheat after medics-less tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,82t *880) (2,82t*625,5)
2481,60 1763,91 1763,91
ALLOCATED COSTS 2128,51 2057,85
Purchased inputs: 516,95 502,25 100,45 401,80
Wheat seed 178,80 178,80 35,76 143,04
Fertiliser 191,13 191,13 38,23 152,90
Crop Chemicals 147,02 132,32 26,46 105,86
Machinery fixed costs: 389,02 389,02 38,90 350,12
Depreciation 259,71 259,71 25,97 233,74
Interest 129,31 129,31 12,93 116,38
Machinery variable costs: 386,60 320,63 95,65 224,98
Fuel 176,47 110,50 22,10 88,40
Repairs/ maintenance 210,13 210,13 73,55 136,58
Implements fixed costs: 241,47 241,47 24,15 217,32
Depreciation 130,37 130,37 13,04 117,33
Interest 111,10 111,10 11,11 99,99
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 205,00 205,00 71,75 133,25
Spraying 42,00 42,00
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Transport 105,00 105,00
Other: 341,18 351,19
Crop insurance 30,00 30,00 1,5 28,50
Labour 33,35 43,36
Interest on operating capital 92,83 92,83
Land 140,00 140,00
Diverse (admin) 45,00 45,00
NET RETURN 353,09 -293,94
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DRC= 1,78 NPCO=I,41 NPCI=I,31 EPC=I,76 PC=-1,20 SRP= 0,37
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Malgas-Heildelbergvlakte region,
South Coast, 1997/98 (Rlha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2481,60 1763,91
Allocated costs 2128,51 2057,85
Tradables: 1817,33 1387,36
Purchased inputs 516,95 401,80
Machinery costs 775,62 575,10
Implement costs 289,76 248,71
Contract/hire service 205,00 133,25
Crop insurance 30,00 28,50
Domestic factors: 311,18 670,49
Cost of land 140,00 140,00
Labour costs 33,355 43,36
Cost of operating capital 92,83 92,83
Components of tradables 349,30
Diverse (admin) 45,00 45,00
Net Return 353,09 -293,94
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Malgas-Heildelbergvlakte
region, South Coast, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2481,60 1817,33 311,18 353,09
Social (shadow) prices 1763,91 1387,36 670,49 -293,94
Policy effect (divergences) 717,69 429,97 -359,31 647,03
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Appendix B.ll: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the
Heildelberg region, South Coast. Wheat after lucerne- less tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,82t *880) (2,82t *625,5)
2481,60 1763,91 1763,91
ALLOCATED COSTS 2570,88 2396,77
Purchased inputs: 696,52 617,23 123,45 493,78
Wheat seed 178,80 178,80 35,76 143,04
Lime 84,00 84,00 16,80 67,20
Fertiliser 221,63 221,63 44,33 177,30
Crop Chemicals 212,09 132,80 26,56 106,24
Machinery fixed costs: 389,02 389,02 38,90 350,12
Depreciation 259,71 259,71 25,97 233,74
Interest 129,31 129,31 12,93 116,38
Machinery variable costs: 627,84 516,55 153,43 363,12
Fuel 297,70 186,41 37,88 148,53
Repairs/ maintenance 330,14 330,14 115,55 214,59
Implements fixed costs: 241,47 241,47 24,15 217,32
Depreciation 130,37 130,37 13,-4 117,33
Interest 111,10 111,10 11,11 99,99
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 205,00 205,00 71,75 133,25
Spraying 42,00 42,00
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Transport 105,00 105,00
Other: 362,74 379,21
Crop insurance 30,00 30,00 1,5 28,50
Labour 54,91 71,38
Interest on operating capital 92,83 92,83
Land 140,00 140,00
Diverse (admin) 45,00 45,00
NET RETURN -89,28 -632,86
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Appendix B.12: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the Ruens
region, South Coast. Wheat after medics- conventional tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,35t *885) (2,35t *625,5)
2079,75 1469,93 1469,93
ALLOCATED COSTS 2124,66 2061,58
Purchased inputs: 606,72 585,69 117,14 468,55
Wheat seed 178,80 178,80 35,76 143,04
Fertiliser 217,65 217,65 43,53 174,12
Crop Chemicals 210,27 189,24 37,85 151,39
Machinery fixed costs: 377,24 377,24 37,72 339,52
Depreciation 232,21 232,21 23,22 208,99
Interest 145,03 145,03 14,50 130,53
Machinery variable costs: 363,15 308,93 94,50 214,43
Fuel 145,04 90,82 18,16 72,66
Repairs/ maintenance 218,11 218,11 76,34 141,77
Implements fixed costs: 142,95 142,95 14,30 128,66
Depreciation 84,05 84,05 8,41 75,65
Interest 58,90 58,90 5,89 53,01
Implements variable costs: 28,59 28,59 10,01 18,58
Contract hire service: 262,50 262,50 91,88 170,62
Spraying 42,00 42,00
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Transport 87,50 87,50
Drying costs 75,00 75,00
Other: 343,51 355,68
Crop insurance 2,88 2,88 0,14 2,74
Labour 40,57 52,74
Interest on operating capital 175,06 175,06
Land 125,00 125,00
NET RETURN -44,91 -591,65
108
Appendix B.13: Enterprise budget (R/ha) for a wheat production system in the
Ruens region, South Coast. Wheat after wheat- minimum tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,49t *885) (2,49t *625,5)
2203,65 1557,50 1557,50
ALLOCATED COSTS 1874,15 1842,44
Purchased inputs: 612,54 598.98 119,80 479,18
Wheat seed 154,53 154,53 30,91 123,62
Lime 2,18 2,18 0,44 1,74
Fertiliser 320,22 320,22 64,04 256,18
Crop Chemicals 135,61 122,05 24,41 97,64
Machinery fixed costs: 377,24 377,24 37,72 339,52
Depreciation 232,21 232,21 23,22 208,99
Interest 145,03 145,03 14,50 130,53
Machinery variable costs: 182,73 152,41 45,73 106,68
Fuel 81,lJ 50,79 10,16 40,63
Repairs/ maintenance 101,62 101,62 35,57 66,05
Implements fixed costs: 142,95 142,95 14,30 128,66
Depreciation 84,05 84,05 8,41 75,65
Interest 58,90 58,90 5,89 53,01
Implements variable costs: 28,59 28,59 10,01 18,58
Contract hire service: 154,69 154,69 54,14 100,55
Spraying 11,90 lJ,90
Marketing costs 106,49 106,49
Transport 36,30 36,30
Labour 0,70 0,70
Other: 375,41 387,58
Crop insurance 2,88 2,88 0,14 2,74
Labour 40,57 52,74
Interest on operating capital 175,06 175,06
Land 125,00 125,00
Diverse 31,90 31,90
NET RETURN 329,50 -284,95
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Budget summary: Wheat production in the Ruens region, South Coast, 1997/98
(Rlha)
PRIV ATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2203,65 1557,50
Allocated costs 1874,15 1842,44
Tradables: 1501,62 1175,91
Purchased inputs 612,54 479,18
Machinery costs 559,97 446,20
Implement costs 171,54 147,24
Contract/hire service 154,69 100,55
Crop insurance 2,88 2,74
Domestic factors: 372,53 666,54
Cost of land 125,00 125,00
Labour costs 40,57 52,74
Cost of operating capital 175,06 175,06
Components of tradables 281,84
Diverse 31,90 31,90
Net Return 329,50 -284,95
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Ruens region, South Coast,
1997/98 (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2203,65 1501,62 372,53 329,50
Social (shadow) prices 1557,50 1175,91 666,54 -284,95
Policy effect (divergences) 646,15 325,71 -294,01 614,45
DRC= 1,75 NPCO= 1,41 NPCI=1,28 EPC= 1,84 PC= -1,16 SRP= 0,39
Appendix B.14: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the Riversdal
region, South Coast. Wheat after lucerne-less tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2t * 880) (2t * 625,5)
1760,00 1251,00 1251,00
ALLOCATED COSTS 2064,02 2027,18
Purchased inputs: 588,60 575,71 115,14 460,57
Wheat seed 186,25 186,25 37,25 149,00
Lime 84,00 84,00 16,80 67,20
Fertiliser 189,50 189,50 37,90 151,60
Crop Chemicals 128,85 115,96 23,19 92,77
Machinery fixed costs: 336,03 336,03 33,60 302,43
Depreciation 184,28 184,28 18,43 165,85
Interest 151,75 151,75 15,18 136,58
Machinery variable costs: 326,95 273,73 82,42 191,29
Fuel 142,36 89,14 17,82 71,31
Repairs/ maintenance 184,59 184,59 64,60 119,98
Implements fixed costs: 241,45 241,45 24,15 217,31
Depreciation 141,97 141,97 14,20 127,77
Interest 99,48 99,48 9,95 89,53
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 230,00 230,00 80,50 149,50
Spraying 42,00 42,00
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Drying cost 60,00 60,00
Transport 70,00 70,00
Other: 292,70 321,97
Crop insurance 5,14 5,14 0,26 4,88
Labour 97,56 126,83
Interest on operating capital 90,00 90,00
Land 100,00 100,00
NET RETURN -304,02 -776,18
III
DRC=-6,30 NPCO= 1,41 NPCI=1,31 EPC= 0,15 PC= 0,39 SRP= 0,38
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Riversdal region, South Coast,
1997/98 (R/ha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 1760,00 1251,00
Allocated costs 2064,02 2027,18
Tradables: 1776,46 1357,37
Purchased inputs 588,60 460,57
Machinery costs 662,98 493,72
Implement costs 289,74 248,70
Contract/hire service 230,00 149,50
Crop insurance 5,14 4,88
Domestic factors: 287,56 669,81
Cost of land 100,00 100,00
Labour costs 97,56 126,84
Cost of operating capital 90,00 90,00
Components of tradables 352,97
Net Return -304,02 -776,18
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Riversdal region, South
Coast, 1997/98 (R/ha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 1760,00 1776,46 287,56 -304,02
Social (shadow) prices 1251,00 1357,37 669,81 -776,18
Policy effect (divergences) 509,00 419,09 -382,25 472,16
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Appendix B.15: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the Slang
River region, South Coast. Wheat after medics- less tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,35t *880) (2,35t*625,5)
2068,00 1469,93 1469,93
ALLOCATED COSTS 2292,50 2219,36
Purchased inputs: 692,01 675,63 135,13 540,50
Wheat seed 178,80 178,80 35,76 143,04
Fertiliser 349,44 349,44 69,89 279,55
Crop Chemicals 163,77 147,39 29,48 117,91
Machinery fixed costs: 465,73 465,73 46,57 419,16
Depreciation 288,57 288,57 28,86 259,71
Interest 177,16 177,16 17,72 159,44
Machinery variable costs: 427,16 354,83 106,02 248,81
Fuel 193,47 121,14 24,23 96,91
Repairs/ maintenance 233,69 233,69 81,79 151,90
Implements fixed costs: 241,47 241,47 24,15 217,32
Depreciation 130,37 130,37 13,04 117,33
Interest 111,10 111,10 11,11 99,99
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 145,50 145,50 50,93 95,58
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Transport 87,50 87,50
Other: 272,34 287,91
Crop insurance 18,69 18,69 0,93 17,76
Labour 51,89 67,46
Interest on operating capital 135,00 135,00
Land 66,76 66,76
NET RETURN -224,50 -749,43
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Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Slang River region, South
Coast, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Slang River region, South Coast,
1997/98 (Rlha)
PRIVATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 2068,00 1469,93
Allocated costs 2292,50 2219,36
Tradables: 2038,85 1634,71
Purchased inputs 692,01 540,50
Machinery costs 892,89 667,97
Implement costs 289,76 312,90
Contractlhire service 145,50 95,58
Crop insurance 18,69 17,76
Domestic factors: 253,65 649,85
Cost of land 66,76 66,76
Labour costs 51,89 67,46
Cost of operating capital 135,00 135,00
Components of tradables 380,63
Net Return -224,50 -749,43
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 2068,00 2038,85 253,65 -224,50
Social (shadow) prices 1469,93 1634,71 649,85 -749,43
Policy effect (divergences) 598,07 404,14 -396,20 524,93
DRC=-3,94 NPCO= 1,41 NPCI=1,25 EPC=-0,18 PC= 0,30 SRP= 0,36
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Appendix B.16: Enterprise budget (R/ha) for wheat production in the Slang
River region, South Coast. Wheat after lucerne- less tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (2,64t *880) (2,64t *625,5)
2323,20 1651,32 1651,32
ALLOCATED COSTS 2355,84 2247,78
Purchased inputs: 825,86 805,48 161,10 644,38
Wheat seed 178,80 178,80 35,76 143,04
Lime 84,00 84,00 16,80 67,20
Fertiliser 359,28 359,28 71,86 287,42
Crop Chemicals 203,78 183,40 36,68 146,72
Machinery fixed costs: 226,77 226,77 22,68 204,09
Depreciation 141,73 141,73 14,17 127,56
Interest 85,04 85,04 8,50 76,54
Machinery variable costs: 585,11 481,86 142,71 339,15
Fuel 276,20 172,95 34,59 138,36
Repairs/ maintenance 308,91 308,91 108,12 200,79
Implements fixed costs: 241,47 241,47 24,15 217,32
Depreciation 130,37 130,37 13,04 117,33
Interest 111,10 111,10 11,11 99,99
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 156,00 156,00 54,60 101,40
Soil tests 58,00 58,00
Transport 98,00 98,00
Other: 272,34 287,91
Crop insurance 18,69 18,69 0,93 17,76
Labour 51,89 67,46
Interest on operating capital 135,00 135,00
Land 66,76 66,76
NET RETURN -32,64 -596,46
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Appendix B.17: Enterprise budget (Rlha) for wheat production in the
Bredasdorp region, South Coast. Wheat after wheat- minimum tillage; 1997/98.
PRIVATE ECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF
PRICES PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Non-tradable Tradable
GROSS RECEIPTS (l,93t *880) (1 ,93t *625,5)
1698,40 1207,22 1207,22
ALLOCATED COSTS 1938,71 1895,04
Purchased inputs: 640,76 593,47 118,69 474,78
Wheat seed 187,20 187,20 37,44 149,76
Fertiliser 327,05 327,05 65,41 261,64
Crop Chemicals 126,51 79,22 15,84 63,38
Machinery fixed costs: 226,77 226,77 22,68 204,09
Depreciation 141,73 141,73 14,17 127,56
Interest 85,04 85,04 8,50 76,54
Machinery variable costs: 323,51 272,48 82,54 189,94
Fuel 136,50 85,47 17,09 68,38
Repairs/ maintenance 187,01 187,01 65,45 121,56
Implements fixed costs: 241,47 241,47 24,15 217,32
Depreciation 130,37 130,37 13,04 117,33
Interest 111,10 111,10 11,11 99,99
Implements variable costs: 48,29 48,29 16,90 31,39
Contract hire service: 46,21 46,21 16,17 30,04
Spraying 40,00 40,00
Drying costs 6,21 6,21
Other: 411,70 466,35
Crop insurance 7,39 7,39 0,37 7,02
Labour 118,19 172,84
Interest on operating capital 124,21 124,21
Land 115,00 115,00
Diverse 46,91 46,91
NET RETURN -240,31 -687,82
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DRC= 14,44 NPCO= 1,41 NPCI=I,33 EPC= 3,20 PC= 0,35 SRP= 0,37
Budget summary: Wheat production in the Bredasdorp region, South Coast,
1997/98 (Rlha)
PRIV ATE PRICES ECONOMIC PRICES
Gross receipts 1698,40 1207,22
Allocated costs 1938,71 1895,04
Tradables: 1534,40 1155,93
Purchased inputs 640,76 474,78
Machinery costs 550,28 394,03
Implement costs 289,76 248,71
Contract/hire service 46,21 31,39
Crop insurance 7,39 7,02
Domestic factors: 404,31 740,46
Cost of land 115,00 115,00
Labour costs 118,19 172,84
Cost of operating capital 124,21 124,21
Components of tradables 281,50
Diverse 46,91 46,91
Net Return -240,31 -687,82
Policy Analysis Matrix for wheat production in the Bredasdorp region, South
Coast, 1997/98 (Rlha)
Benefits Costs Profits
Gross Revenues Tradable Domestic
inputs factors
Private (market) prices 1698,40 1534,40 404,31 -240,31
Social (shadow) prices 1207,22 1155,93 740,46 -687,82
Policy effect (divergences) 491,18 378,47 -336,15 447,51
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Appendix C.l: Tabulated private prices of all17 budgets
Budget Gross Receipts Allocated Costs Net Returns
(Rlha) (Rlha) (Rlha)
B1-Moorreesburg 2538.00 2190.37 347.63
B2-Moorreesburg 2520.00 2243.68 276.32
B3-Moorreesburg 2439.00 2494.18 -55.18
B4-Piketberg 2327.00 2315.67 11.33
B5-Piketberg 2506.00 2801.17 -295.17
B6-Malmesbury 2543.05 2659.95 -116.90
B7-Malmesbury 2534.00 2822.92 -288.92
B8-Malmesbury 3176.55 2662.96 513.59
B9-Heidelberg 2068.00 2317.44 -249.44
Bl 0-Heidel berg 2481.60 2128.51 353.09
B11-Heidelberg 2481.60 2570.88 -81.28
B12-Ruens 2079.75 2124.66 -44.91
B13-Ruens 2203.65 1874.15 329.50
B14-Riversdal 1760.00 2064.02 -304.02
B15-S1ang River 2068.00 2292.50 -224.50
B16-Slang River 2323.20 2355.84 -32.64
B17-Bredasdorp 1698.40 1938.71 -240.31
Average 2338.11 2344.57 -5.99
Appendix C.2: Graphic representation of Gross Receipts from the enterprise
budgets
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Appendix C.3: Graphic representation of Allocated Costs from the enterprise
budgets
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Appendix C.4: Graphic representation of Net Returns from the enterprise
budgets
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Appendix C.S: Tabulated private prices for allocated costs of all 17 budgets
(Rlha)
Budget 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
81- Moorreesburg 640.47 397.09 142.52 394.91 85.57 57.00 472.71
B2-Moorreesburg 642.78 397.09 142.52 394.91 85.57 108.00 472.71
83-Moorreesburg 595.00 397.09 238.28 394.91 85.57 291.83 491.40
84- Piketberg 798.56 409.43 146.95 394.91 85.57 33.00 447.25
85-Piketberg 827.37 527.64 485.43 394.91 85.57 33.00 447.25
86- Malmesbury 1000.12 432.25 354.97 88.02 56.77 80.19 647.63
87-Malmesbury 1036.98 465.73 556.00 88.02 91.64 71.26 513.29
B8-Malmesbury 1181.13 465.73 362.90 88.02 21.63 103.38 420.17
89-Heidelberg 901.56 389.02 217.24 241.47 48.29 187.50 332.36
810-Heidelberg 516.95 389.02 386.60 241.47 48.29 205.00 341.18
BIl-Heidelberg 696.52 389.02 627.84 241.47 48.29 205.00 362.74
B12-Ruens 606.72 377.24 363.15 142.95 28.59 262.50 343.51
813-Ruens 612.54 377.24 182.73 142.95 28.59 154.69 375.41
814- Riversdal 588.60 336.03 326.95 241.45 48.29 230.00 292.70
815-Slang River 692.01 465.73 427.16 241.47 48.29 145.50 272.34
8 16-Slang River 825.86 226.77 585.11 241.47 48.29 156.00 272.34
817-Bredasdorp 640.76 226.77 323.51 241.47 48.29 46.21 411.70
Average
753.17 392.29 345.29 247.93 58.42 139.42 406.86
1- Purchased inputs
2- Machinery fixed costs
3- Machinery variable costs
4- Implements fixed costs
5- Implements variable costs
6- Contract hire service
7- Other costs
Appendix C.6: Graphic representation of Purchased inputs from the enterprise
budgets
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Appendix C.7: Graphic representation of Machinery fixed costs from the
enterprise budgets
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Appendix C.S: Graphic representation of Machinery variable costs from the
enterprise budgets
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Appendix C.9: Graphic representation of Implements fixed costs from the
enterprise budgets
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Appendix C.IO: Graphic representation of Implements variable costs from the
enterprise budgets
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Appendix C.lt: Graphic representation of Contract hire costs from the
enterprise budgets
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Appendix C.12: Graphic representation of Other costs from the enterprise
budgets
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Appendix C.13: Tabulated social prices of all17 budgets
Budget Gross Receipts Allocated Costs Net Returns
(R/ha) (Rlha) (R/ha)
Bl-Moorreesburg 1763.91 2194.84 -430.93
B2-Moorreesburg 1751.40 2249.l1 -497.71
B3-Moorreesburg 1695.11 2459.38 -764.27
B4-Piketberg 1626.30 2284.28 -657.98
B5-Piketberg 1751.40 2718.03 -966.93
B6-Malmesbury 1757.66 2560.95 -803.29
B7-Malmesbury 1751.40 2656.81 -905.41
B8-Malmesbury 2195.51 2614.30 -418.80
B9-Heidelberg 1469.93 2258.l0 -788.18
Bl 0-Heidelberg 1763.91 2057.85 -293.94
BIl-Heidelberg 1763.91 2396.77 -632.86
B12-Ruens 1469.93 2061.58 -591.65
B13-Ruens 1557.50 1842.44 -284.95
B14-Riversdal 1251.00 2027.l8 -776.18
B15-Slang River 1469.32 2219.36 -749.43
B16-Slang River 1651.32 2247.78 -596.46
Bl 7-Bredasdorp 1207.22 1895.04 -687.82
Average 1640.98 2279.05 -638.05
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Appendix D:
Transport Costing from silo to variable delivery points -October, 1999 (SAFEX)
Appendix E:
The South African Agricultural Tariff Regime
10 Statutory levies are a dedicated tax per unit or ad valorum of an agricultural commodity at any point
in the marketing chain between and including the producer and consumer (Bayley, 1998).
"Tariff application in South Africa lacks the necessary policy guidance that is in line
with the broad primary economic objectives, the general agricultural policy and the
agricultural trade policy, on national as well as sectoral level" (Steenkamp, 1999).
This study tells of forms of non-tariff barriers that exist in the SADC, and SACU
regions as well as internationally. Such barriers include quantitative control (import
control), sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, levies'" (taxes), and strict packaging
regulations. These forms of barriers to trade directly impact on the effects of tariff
liberalisation.
Various conclusions and recommendations were made in this study, including the
need for tariff liberalisation. The wheat industry is practising the opposite of this and
an increase in the import tariff for wheat has been implemented (SAGA, 1999). Tariff
policy and liberalisation is an integral part of promoting exports and growth in the
South African economy. South Africa needs a growth and export boost, which
Steenkamp states could be brought about by liberalisation and the efforts of
competitive parts of the economy. "Tariff protection costs jobs elsewhere in the
economy and reduces the national income and growth prospects. South Africa needs
growth ... then we could afford the high price of mis-allocation of resources"
(Steenkamp, 1999).
Appendix F:
Target Costing
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Target costing aims at profit enhancement by developing products with the right level
of quality and functionality, as well as appropriate prices. Consumer preference must
be identified and expressed as innovative design options. The target cost of the
product is determined as the price partially predefined by competition minus the target
profit, guided by competitor profit.
In the case of a commodity such as wheat, the cost reduction aim will dominate.
Wheat farmers should treat their suppliers as partners both during the design process
and when they are setting cost targets as producer study groups, possibly supported by
the extension capacity of a co-operative or agricultural companies in a region. Target
costing should further be seen as a continuous development approach to innovation
management in the wheat industry (Street et al., 1998).
129
